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ABSTRACT 
Australia has always turned to the United States for guidance and 
inspiration. We appreciate U.S. fashion, take a strong interest in U.S. 
politics, and are heavy consumers of U.S. film, television shows and 
music. But in relation to U.S. corporate regulation and corporate law 
scholarship, Australia is decidedly slow on the uptake. It would be 
wrong to suggest that Australia does not follow what is going on in the 
U.S. corporate law arena, particularly since the collapse of Enron and 
WorldCom, but it hasn't excited us. Like much that comes out of the 
U.S., the great nation of liberty's corporate law scholarship and 
approach to corporate regulation can generally be described as 
brilliant. 
In this article, I tap into this brilliance in an attempt to unlock the 
hidden genius of Australian takeovers law. It is argued that the 
regulation of Australia's market of corporate control can be made more 
efficient not through the conventional process of law reform, but rather 
through a fresh approach to corporate regulation (and more 
specifically takeovers regulation) involving the application of principles 
of marketing and product design. A trip to the other side of the world 
reveals a lot about Australian takeovers law that most observers do not 
appreciate. It is well worth the plane ticket. 
Re-examining Australian takeovers regulation through a U.S. lens 
is not of mere academic interest. Nor is it merely a topic of interest to 
Australians. In fact, Australia has the strongest takeovers market in the 
Asia-Pacific region (excluding Japan), and has one of the most active 
takeovers market in the world. The Australia-US. Free Trade 
Agreement, which came into effect at the beginning of 2005, also makes 
it a lot easier for U.S. corporations to invest in Australia, making 
Australia a more attractive opportunity for U.S. investors. It is 
therefore important that Australian takeovers law, an important product 
in the market for corporate control in Australia, is designed so as to be 
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as efficient as possible. 
This article is about effective product management of Australian 
takeovers regulation, drawing upon ideas and thinking in the U.S., to 
make it a more attractive product going forward. 
In this article, I explain how a mix of U.S. ingenuity and Australian 
vision can achieve greater freedom for participants in Australia's 
market for corporate control. 
INTRODUCTION 
Purpose of the Article 
The idea behind this article is to unlock the hidden "genius" of 
Australian takeovers law. 1 This is to be achieved not by way of 
legislative reform, but rather by taking a fresh look at the law which 
already exists, in light of the structure of U.S. takeovers law and 
innovation in U.S. corporate law scholarship, along with the use of 
principles and concepts in marketing. 
It will draw upon the U.S. economic analysis of law and corporate 
law; more specifically, treating law as a product in a market. 
Accordingly, this makes it useful to draw upon principles of marketing 
to make the product more effective in responding to consumer demand. 
This article will adopt a "product management approach" to 
takeovers law, seeking guidance from the U.S. to make the product 
more efficient, in order to respond to consumer demand and thus to 
justify the continued existence of this product in the market. In doing 
so, it will look to the regulation of takeovers in the U.S., a system which 
has similar objectives to Australian takeovers regulation but which is 
more streamlined, despite operating in a more sophisticated and active 
market for corporate control. 
The approach of this article has strong parallels with a famous 
statement of former U.S. President John F. Kennedy, "[c]itizens of the 
world: ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can 
do for the freedom of man. "2 This article is about how applying 
American thought and practice to the existing structure of Australian 
takeover law will provide for greater freedom, and overall greater 
efficiency in the operation of Australian takeovers regulation. 
1. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993) (in using the 
word "genius" the author draws inspiration from Roberta Romano's famous monograph). 
2. U.S. President John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961), available at 
http://www.hpol.org/jfk/inaugural (last visited Nov. 28, 2006). 
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Learningfrom the United States: It Must Be Doing Something Right 
As Tom Cruise's character said in Jerry Maguire, "America sets 
the tone for the world."3 Notwithstanding recent talk of a slippage in 
U.S. dominance and influence, there are factors which will ensure that 
the U.S. sets the tone for a long time to come. 
It makes sense for this article to focus on the U.S. The U.S. has the 
largest economy in the world; indeed over one fifth of the world's gross 
domestic product (GDP) occurs in the U.S.4 More specifically, the U.S. 
is also home to the largest and most successful corporations in the 
world, and also has a very healthy mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
market. Part I of this article will look at the statistics that confirm the 
dominance of the U.S. 
Thus, as a producer of corporate law, the U.S. is a successful 
operator. Australia, in developing its product for offer in an emerging 
region for M&A activity, could do a lot worse than tum to the U.S. for 
guidance in relation to corporate regulation, and takeovers law in 
general. It is time for Australia and its corporate regulator, the 
Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC), to be inspired 
and get excited about corporate regulation. 
The Global Importance of Australia's Market for Corporate Control 
This article is not simply about focusing on the takeover rules of a 
jurisdiction that is a nice place for a holiday, but does not really have 
much practical importance. While I understand as well as anybody that 
it is useful to know about what is going on in another jurisdiction, 
pragmatism dictates that one's time is better spent learning more about 
the rules in one's home jurisdiction. 
But this is not the case in relation to Australian takeovers law. 
Australia is the busiest M&A market in the Asia-Pacific region 
(excluding Japan), and rates highly in international foreign direct 
investment (FDI) confidence surveys. Americans are the biggest 
investors in Australia, and this trend is only going to continue due to the 
recently-enacted free trade agreement, which (among other things) 
liberalizes foreign investment rules between the two countries. In terms 
of M&A, more American eyes will inevitably tum to Australia. 
Below is a summary of some useful recent statistics on Australia. 
3. Jerry Maguire (Tri-Star Pictures 1996). 
4. Yahoo!, World Factbook: GDP Statistics Country Comparison Table, 
http://education.yahoo.com/reference/factbook/ country compare/ gdp/la.html;_y It= AouSSu4 
KOUTuwbu2jBYLFNLGecYF (last visited Dec. 7, 2006). 
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Australian Economy 
Australia is the fourth largest economy in the Asia-Pacific, and the 
fourteenth largest in the world. According to the World Competitive 
Yearbook, Australia has the third lowest level of political instability in 
the world. Furthermore, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, 
Australia is the sixth best place to live in the world: the only non-
European country in the top ten. 5 
Australia's M&A Market 
According to the KPMG Corporate Finance survey of the 
Australian takeovers market for 2004 and 2005, Australia is one of the 
top three active M&A markets in the world, and the largest in the Asia-
Pacific region, excluding Japan. Furthermore, according to the KPMG 
survey, Australia is currently experiencing an aggressive M&A market. 
From 2004 to June 2005, M&A activity was up 55%.6 
Australia is home to approximately 4% of the worldwide M&A 
market. According to KPMG, in 2005, $27 billion (USD) worth of 
deals were done in Australia, out of $671 billion (USD) worth of deals 
worldwide. 
In a paper published in 2002, M&A lawyer Justin Mannolini 
explained that, "[a] stable political system, independent judiciary, 
reliable money supply and recognition and protection of property rights 
are all critical" - making Australia a potentially important M&A 
destination, even though it "has an extremely small capital base by 
world standards."7 
Foreign Direct Investment in Australia 
According to A.T. Kearney's 2004 FDI Confidence Index survey, 
Australia ranked as the "seventh most attractive destination in the world 
5. AMERICAN AUSTRALIAN ASSOCIATION, US - AUSTRALIA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
http://www.americanaustralian.org/Services/storyprint.php?storyld=2028&type=story (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2006). 
6. Note, however, that according to the December 2005 edition of Australia's 
Corporate Law Electronic Bulletin: "The value of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in 
Australia dropped by 19 percent in 2005 compared to the same period in 2004, according to 
research by KPMGs Corporate Finance practice published on 5 December 2005. While the 
number of deals rose slightly from 612 in the first 11 months of 2004 to 651 in the first 11 
months of 2005, the value of deals fell substantially from $61 billion to $49 billion over the 
same time frame." CORPORATE LAW ELECTRONIC BULLETIN, available at 
http://cclsr.law.unimelb.edu.au/go/corporate-law-bulletin/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2006). 
7. See Justin Mannolini, Convergence or Divergence: Is There a Role for the Eggleston 
Principles in a Global M&A Environment?, 24 SYDNEY. L.REv. 336, 342 (2002). 
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for foreign direct investment."8 American and British investors 
accounted for more than half of the FDI investment in Australia.9 
On its website, the American Australian Association provides 
statistics that confirm that "[t]he U.S. is Australia's largest source of 
foreign direct investment, with assets of $53 billion held by American 
investors."10 
According to the American Australian Association, U.S. direct 
investment into Australia is likely to increase due to the Australia -
United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA). "American 
investment in Australia will be made easier with the FT A. Most 
investments will be exempted from screening by the Australian Foreign 
Investment Review Board with the threshold for screening in most 
sectors raised to $600 million." 11 Under the AUSFTA, "90 per cent of 
investments that were screened prior to the FT A will now be exempted 
from screening," benefiting U.S. investors with an interest m 
Australia. 12 
Under the AUSFTA, U.S. investors will be attracted to 
"Australia's growing services market, including telecommunications, 
express delivery, computer and IT, tourism, energy, construction and 
engineering, financial services, audio-visual and entertainment, 
professional, education and training." 13 
In a media release dated January 1, 2005, then U.S. Trade 
Representative, Robert B. Zoellick, stated that the AUSFTA "is a 
milestone in the history of our alliance," 14 as it was the first FTA 
between the U.S. and a developed state since 1988. 15 Zoellick 
continued, "[t]his is a 21st century, state-of-the-art agreement that 
reflects the modem globalized economy. By opening trade ... [and] 
eliminating barriers in ... investment ... the agreement will strengthen 
8. New S. Wales Dep't of State and Reg'l Dev., Foreign Direct Investment Confidence 
Index 2004, available at http: //www.business.nsw.gov/au/facts (follow "Section B-Trade 
and Investment" hyperlink, then follow "B6: Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index, 
2004" hyperlink). 
9. New S. Wales Dep't of State and Reg'l Dev. , supra note 8 (follow "Section B-Trade 
and Investment" hyperlink, then follow "B9: Stock of Foreign Investment in Australia by 
Country, 2004" hyperlink). 
10. American Australian Association, supra note 5. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Press Release, U.S. Mission to the U.N. in Geneva, Landmark U.S.-Australia Free 
Trade Agreement Goes into Effect Today, (Jan. 1, 2005), available at http://us-
mission.ch/Press2005/0103landmarkusaustralia.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2006). 
15. Id. 
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U.S.-Australian economic ties."16 
The effect of the recently enacted AUSFTA is likely, therefore, to 
increase investor interest in Australia by providing greater market 
access for U.S. firms. 
Much of Australia's FDI activities results from cross-border M&A. 
According to the New South Wales Department of State and Regional 
Development website: "[T]he growth in M&A activity reflects the 
strength of Australia's corporate sector. Strong profits and healthy 
balance sheets are encouraging Australian companies to actively seek 
growth opportunities via M&A, both domestically and offshore. 
Overseas companies are also buying into Australian companies."17 
In light of the above, given that corporate law is a significant 
product having a presence in the market for corporate control "down 
under," the design of this product should be of interest just as much to 
Americans (as well as investors in other jurisdictions) as to Australians. 
It will be explained that while Australia is a significant player in 
the region in terms of M&A, as one of the main M&A markets in the 
world, the market is not large enough to warrant the elaborate 
regulatory system operating in Australia at present. It is simply not 
efficient and does not work as far as product design is concerned. 
But change can be achieved without law reform. Rather than law 
reform, economic efficiency can be injected into Australia's takeover 
law by turning to the U.S. for inspiration, starting with an economic 
analysis of law, with the law framed as a product in a market whose 
existence can be justified if an efficiency improvement can be achieved. 
Perceiving the law as a product in a market allows us to draw upon 
principles of marketing, rather than adopting a conventional approach of 
law reform, to make the product more effective. Marketing is about 
responding to consumer demand. There is no reason why the product of 
takeovers law should be removed from this process. This will be 
explored in later sections. 
The overriding position in this article is that as much as is 
appropriate (that is, in the absence of clear distortions impeding 
adequate investor protection and business efficacy), the market for 
corporate control should be allowed to operate unfettered. As a 
participant, government should only intervene in the market when it can 
contribute towards the effective functioning of the market; that is, if 
16. U.S. Mission to the U.N. in Geneva, supra note 14. 
17. New S. Wales Dep't of State and Reg'l Dev., supra note 8. 
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government is a "pusher" in the sense described by Michael Porter. 18 
I outline a proposal for redesign of the product of Australian 
takeovers law, involving a fresh look at § 611(7) of Australia's 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), to achieve just that. 
Towards Thinking about Australian Corporate Law: Drawing 
Inspiration from the United States 
A lot has been written recently about convergence, and about the 
possibility of an "end of history,"19 in corporate law. I believe that 
"Americanizing" Australian corporate law would have significant 
benefits, both in terms of corporate law practice and theory. 
Convergence along American lines would not simply be about 
eliminating a conflict between ideologies, but would also be about 
injecting life, energy and innovation into the practice and scholarship of 
corporate law. As this article will demonstrate in the specific context of 
takeovers law, this is a positive move. 
Turning to the U.S. to generate inspiration for Australian corporate 
law would prove very beneficial. In particular, a lot can be gained 
through applying an economic analysis of law and corporate law, which 
was born out of the U.S. 
As will be explained further in later sections, economic analysis 
treats the corporation as a collection of contracts between stakeholders, 
and corporate law as a set of default terms which companies can (or 
ought to be able to) opt in or out of based on a cost-benefit analysis of 
the utility of these terms. External regulation in the form of corporate 
law rules is considered justifiable only if the rules can generate an 
efficiency improvement over and above the market. In the specific area 
of takeovers regulation, economic analysis sees corporate law rules 
operating in a "market for corporate control." 
Corporate law rules can therefore collectively be treated as a 
product in a market, and will only (and should only) survive if they are 
designed and marketed effectively to respond to consumer demand in 
the market. 
Structure of the Article 
One key theme of the article, which will shape the analysis and my 
approach, is that corporate law, and regulation through public sources 
18. MICHAELE. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 681 (1998). 
19. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 
89 GEO. L. J. 439 (2001). 
7
McConvill: Getting A Good Buy With A Little Help From A Friend: Turning To T
Published by SURFACE, 2006
160 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 34: 153 
more generally, is a product in the market for corporate control. To 
have in place an effective place in the market, the product provider 
needs to work out how to best deliver it so that it performs a desirable 
function. In this sense, this article is very much about the effective 
marketing of Australian takeovers law, and the application of 
established principles of marketing to achieve better product 
management, rather than being about conventional law reform. 
We are dealing with a market for corporate control, a strong 
market with a lot of potential, and therefore need to approach Australian 
takeovers law through this fresh lens. 
Accordingly, Part I explores in some detail basic principles of 
marketing, and the specific arm of marketing known as product 
management, and applies this learning to takeovers law in order to 
explore how this product can be made more effective in a market for 
corporate control. 
Takeovers law is placed in an otherwise unfettered market for 
corporate control and needs to be approached as such. We are simply 
dealing with a product in a market, and working out how to design and 
manage that product so that its place in the market is justified. 
This article also takes the position that regulatory reform is only 
warranted if it leads to an efficiency improvement. It is explained that 
this does not come at the expense of investor protection. The vision for 
takeovers regulation explored in this article does not in any way 
undermine investor protection. The protections that have been in place 
will remain in place. Moreover, it could be said that investors are in 
fact greatly empowered by the vision outlined by way of enhanced 
choice. 
It is time for excitement, innovation, and just plain thinking, about 
Australian corporate law, and takeovers law more specifically. As will 
be elucidated, innovation leads to improved efficiency, and the injection 
of efficiency leads to tangible improvements in the economy which 
helps people's lives. In this case, a more sophisticated market for 
corporate control, can produce a stronger economy. 
As former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating said in 1996, 
"[i]n the end it's the big picture which changes nations," and "[t]here 
has to be imagination, and there's got to be belief." 20 
This article is structured as follows. Part I provides some 
20. Prime Minister Paul Keating (Austl.), Concession Speech (Mar. 2, 1996), available 
at http: //www.australianpolitics.com/ elections/ 1996/96-03-02keating-concession. shtml (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2006). 
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background on the U.S. economy and the U.S. takeovers market, as a 
prelude to exploring the economic analysis of law- a movement which 
began in the U.S. There will be a particular focus on the economic 
analysis of takeovers regulation, along with a discussion of takeovers 
regulation in the U.S. The concept of the "market for corporate control" 
will be considered. 
Part II introduces the reader to Australian takeovers regulation. 
Through two key regimes making up the regulation of takeovers, or 
what will also be referred to as "corporate control transactions," the 
"Chapter 6" takeovers code and the scheme of arrangement procedure in 
Part 5 .1 of the Corporations Act, will also be explored. Section 611 (7) 
of the Corporations Act, an important component of the regulation of 
takeovers in Australia and which is central to the discussion in Part III, 
will also be introduced. 
In Part III, I paint a picture of how I would like takeovers law in 
Australia to be approached. First, it is argued that, drawing on U.S. 
economic analysis of law, corporations should have greater freedom 
concerning whether they abide by formal takeover rules (takeovers law 
provided in legislation), or provide their own alternative rules. It is 
discussed that this potential for flexibility is already facilitated in 
Australian takeovers regulation, but is not really treated as such. 
If this flexibility is embraced, it is argued that there would not be 
the need for a dual regime of Chapter 6 and schemes to regulate 
takeovers in Australia. Accordingly, contrary to what Australian M&A 
lawyers Tony Damian and Andrew Rich contend in their recent 
monograph Schemes, Takeovers and Himalayan Peaks,21 I believe that 
the schemes regime should no longer be used for takeovers. It is in this 
sense that I argue it is time to return down the mountain. I argue that 
takeovers law in Australia should come in the form of a self-contained 
Chapter 6. It is explained that, with greater use of § 611 (7) of the 
Corporations Act, this would not come at the expense of some 
acknowledged commercial benefits of using schemes of arrangement 
for corporate control transactions as an alternative to Chapter 6. 
Part III also explains how § 611 (7) of the Corporations Act can be 
utilized to provide for greater flexibility in the regulation of takeovers, 
and make Australian takeovers law more efficient and effective as a 
product in the market for corporate control. Part IV concludes. 
21. TONY DAMIAN & ANDREW RICH, SCHEMES, TAKEOVERS AND HIMALAYAN PEAKS 
(2004). 
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I. ALL THEW AY WITH THE U.S.A. 
A. Harold Holt was Right 
This article draws inspiration from the U.S. to improve the design 
of Australian takeovers law in the market for corporate control. It is in 
this sense that I believe we should go "all the way with the U.S.A." 
This is similar to the statement made by former Australian Prime 
Minister, Harold Holt, in 1966 that Australia should go "[a]ll the way 
with LBJ"22 - referring to U.S. President Lyndon Johnson. Holt made 
the statement as support for the U.S.-led Vietnam War.23 
Below I provide some context for why I believe that Australia 
should follow the U.S. line in regulating takeovers. 
B. The Brilliance of the U.S. Economy 
According to the World Bank's World Data Profile for 2004, the 
world GDP for 2004 was $41.4 trillion (USD) ( 40.3 trillion GNI). 
During this period, U.S. GDP was $11.7 trillion (USD) (12.l trillion 
GNI). Therefore, the U.S. accounts for roughly 25% of the world 
economy.24 
The magnitude of the U.S. economy is emphasized by considering 
the size of other developed economies. According to the same World 
Bank data, for 2004, UK GDP was $2.1 trillion (USD), Japan was $4.6 
trillion (USD), Germany was $2. 7 trillion (USD), China was $1.9 
trillion (USD), Canada was $978 billion (USD), and Australia was $637 
billion (USD).25 
C. The Brilliance of the U.S. Takeovers Market 
The U.S. takeovers market is second to none in terms of size and 
sophistication. According to Mergermarket.com's "Deal Drivers USA-
Half Year 2005,"26 in the first half of 2005, "buyers bought North 
American targets with a combined value about 30% higher than the first 
22. Australia's Prime Ministers, Harold Holt, 
http://primeministers.naa.gov/au/meetpm.asp?pageName=inoffice&pmld=l 7 (last visited 
Dec. 7, 2006). 
23. See also TOM FRAME, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF HAROLD HOLT (2005). 
24. The World Bank Group, World Development Indicators Data Query, 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2006). 
25. Id. 
26. Mergermarket.com, Deal Drivers USA - Half Year 2005, August l, 2005, 
http://www.mergermarket.com/public/default.asp?pagename=remark_detail&docid=723 
(last visited Nov. 23, 2006). 
10
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 34, No. 1 [2006], Art. 5
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol34/iss1/5
2006] Applicability of U.S. Takeovers Laws in Australia 163 
half oflast year. At $531 [billion], it is on pace to hit $1 [trillion]."27 
Mergermarket.com explains that "North American mergers have 
not passed that milestone since 2000 when they totaled close to 
$1.7[trillion] ... [T]here were three $20 [billion] plus deals in the first 
half of 2005 . . . There were eight deals with values between $10 
[billion] and $20 [billion]."28 
According to recent worldwide M&A data from Thomson 
Financial, for the third quarter of 2004 "worldwide M&A activity 
checked in at $391.5 billion . . . bringing the cumulative 2004 dollar 
value to $1.27 trillion." For the U.S., M&A in the first three quarters of 
2004 totaled $568 billion. The third quarter total was $154.4 billion.29 
Importantly, what this means is that U.S. M&A account for roughly 
40% of worldwide M&A. 
In a recent article published in the Columbia Journal of European 
Law, Mathias Siems commented that the U.S. M&A market is only 
going to get bigger, due to a growth in cross-border mergers - in which 
the U.S. will be one party to the merger.30 
D. The Brilliance of U.S. Legal Scholarship 
There is much that the U.S. can be proud of when it comes to legal 
scholarship. It is clearly home to the best law schools and faculty in the 
world. 
One particular initiative that has stemmed from the work of U.S. 
scholars, and has had a profound impact on the way we think about the 
law (including corporate law and takeovers regulation) is the economic 
analysis of law - otherwise known as "law and economics." 
1. What Do We Mean by Economic? 
Before delving into an exploration of the economic analysis of law, 
it is important that one is clear regarding what "economic" means in this 
context. According to the doyen of the modem law and economics 
movement, Richard Posner, economics must "explore the implications 
of assuming that man is a rational maximi[z]er of his ends in life, his 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. THOMSON FINANCIAL, THOMSON FINANCIAL WORLDWIDE M&A (2004), available at 
http://www.thomson.com/pdf/financial/league_table/ma/3Q2004/244 l l /3Q04_MA_PR_ US 
_Global.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2006). 
30. See generally Mathias M. Siems, The European Directive on Cross-Border 
Mergers: An International Model?, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 167 (2004). 
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satisfaction," defined as "self-interest."31 This concept of man implies 
man's response to incentives; "that if a person's surroundings change in 
such a way that he could increase his satisfactions by altering his 
behavior, he will do so."32 
David Barnes and Lynn Stout have also provided a useful 
explanation of the meaning of "economic."33 In their treatise on law 
and economics, they define economics as concerning the resolution of 
competing claims. Notwithstanding the various political perspectives 
from which economists evaluate law, "many take the traditional or neo-
classical perspective that evaluates the benefits and burdens of a legal 
rule according to a single principle, economic efficiency."34 
Economic studies rational choice in a world of scarcity. The 
fundamental goal of economic analysis is getting the most from the 
scarce resources available to satisfy society's needs and wants by 
allocating them efficiently among competing uses. 35 
2. Efficiency in Economics 
As we can see from the above commentary, a central concept 
operating in the field of economics is that of "efficiency." According to 
Posner in The Economic Analysis of Law, "efficiency" means the 
"allocation of resources in which value is maximized. "36 Economic 
analysis perceives efficiency as being about "directing resources to their 
most valuable use."37 
Hans-Bernard Schafer and Claus Ott in their work The Economic 
Analysis of Civil Law provide another explanation of efficiency, as 
employed by economists, which "has nothing to do with its common 
usage."38 A society has achieved efficiency where its members and its 
resources "have achieved the highest possible level of utility."39 
31. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-4 (5th ed. 1998). 
32. Id. at 4. 
33. See DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND 
ECONOMICS (1992). 
34. Id. at 1. As to the meaning of "efficiency" in this context, Barnes and Stout state 
that: "Allocative efficiency means using scarce resources to the greatest possible advantage, 
'getting the most' out of them. Whether a particular use is efficient will depend, by 
definition, on what exactly one wants to gain or accomplish." Id. at 6. 
35. Id. at 1-2. 
36. POSNER, supra note 31, at 13. 
37. BARNES & STOUT, supra note 33, at 17. 
38. HANS-BERNARD SCHAFER & CLAUS OTT, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CIVIL LAW 
(2004). 
39. Id. at 8. 
The meaning of efficiency as used by economists has nothing to do with its common 
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This explanation of efficiency refers to a particular type of 
efficiency known to economists as "Pareto efficiency." This is different 
from "Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency," which is well known in welfare 
economics.40 
3. Economic Analysis of Law in General 
Scholarship in corporate law, as well as most other areas of the 
law, has been made far more dynamic and interesting through the 
application of thinking and concepts arising out of the economic 
analysis of law in the U.S. 
Even though a certain amount of the assumptions and conclusions 
derived from an economic analysis of law are questionable, there is no 
question that it has made people think, and has changed both the 
scholarship, and even the practice of a variety of areas of law, for the 
better. 
Economic analysis of the law underpins the ideas contained in this 
article.The "economic theory of law", according to Posner, uses 
economics to "explain as many legal phenomena as possible."41 Legal 
regulation employs cost-benefit analyses to allocate resources in an 
efficient manner.42 "Much of [the economic analysis of law] is 
concerned with proposing economic explanations for legal phenomena 
modeled in economic terms. "43 
According to Yale's Jules Coleman, Posner believes that where 
usage. It has a very precise meaning that can then be used as an elementary 
principle for the design of social institutions. A society is considered efficient, if 
and only if, under the given endowment it is no longer possible to improve the 
welfare of any individual and at the same time no individual has been made worse 
off. In other words, given the resources initially available and their allocation, the 
members of a society have achieved the highest possible level of utility. It should be 
clear that a society with efficient institutions and legal systems is not necessarily 
just. It may be the case that one has to accept a loss of efficiency in order to achieve 
particular normative goals. 
See also RAY STEINWALL ET. AL., BUTTERWORTHS AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION LAW 97-98 
(2000) ("Economic efficiency ... refers to a situation where the economic system allocates 
resources in such a way as to produce the goods and services which consumers value most 
highly and are prepared to pay for, and it does so at the least possible price in terms of 
resource use."). 
40. For a discussion of these concepts, see Jules L. Coleman, Economics and the Law: 
a Critical Review of the Foundations of the Economic Approach to Law, 94 ETHICS 649, 
650-52 (1984). 
41. POSNER, supra note 31, at 28. 
42. Id. at 27-28. 
43. Id. at 18. See also Richard Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. 
REV. 757 (1975); Avery Wiener Katz, Positivism and the Separation of Law and 
Economics, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2229 (1996). 
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there are transaction costs giving rise to a role for the law, the law ought 
to "mimic the market." That means that "the law ought to mimic ... the 
Coasian market of rational, fully informed individuals completely 
cooperating with one another in an effort to maximize joint welfare (or 
profits) through mutually beneficial exchange. "44 
Coleman also usefully explains that Posner's economic analysis of 
law suggests that, "what is efficient depends on what people are willing 
to pay and what people are willing to pay in turn depends on what they 
are capable of paying."45 
4. Economic Analysis of Corporate Law 
The economic analysis of law has been usefully applied to 
numerous specialized areas of law. One of the more successful efforts 
of utilizing economic analysis has been in the area of corporate law, 
being the rules that regulate corporations (thus including takeovers 
regulation).46 
In a recent article, UCLA law professor Stephen Bainbridge has 
provided an excellent summary of how the corporation (and corporate 
law rules) are understood applying an economic analysis of law. 
Bainbridge, in the law and economics literature (with the so-called 
"nexus of contracts" understanding of the corporation), suggests how to 
obtain corporate law default rules: "'If the parties could costlessly 
bargain over the question, which rule would they adopt?'-and then 
adopt that bargain as the corporate law default rule."47 
44. See Coleman, supra note 40, at 659. 
45. Id. at 662. 
46. See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A 
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 57 (2002): 
Id. 
The governance of U.S. corporations is largely determined by the law of the state in 
which each firm has chosen to incorporate. . . . Governance provisions in stock 
exchange listing agreements can also be considered a form of contract given firms' 
ability to choose the exchange or exchanges on which they are listed. 
47. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1744 (2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=808584. 
[L ]egal rules are analogized to a standard form contract voluntarily adopted -
perhaps with modifications - by the parties. As with any standard form contract, the 
law's principal purpose in this area is to facilitate private ordering by reducing 
bargaining costs. Parties for whom the default rule makes sense thus can take the 
default rules off the rack, without having to bargain over them. Parties for whom 
the default rules are inappropriate, however, remain free to bargain for a different 
rule. . . . In such settings, identifying the party for whom getting its way has the 
highest value becomes the crucial question. If termination costs are zero, the default 
rules- whether contained in a statute or private standard form contract- do not matter 
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In this sense, corporate law rules are a product that parties 
(corporations) can choose to purchase "off the rack," or choose an 
alternative product.48 
This "contractual" approach is beginning to have a major influence 
on European corporate law and scholarship. This is the result of the 
phasing out of the "real seat doctrine," and the shift to a "state of 
incorporation" doctrine, through a series of decisions of the European 
Court of Justice, starting with Centros.49 The European Court of Justice 
found that the real seat rule (which was applied in most EU member 
states) was incompatible with the Freedom of Establishment guaranteed 
by the Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Community. 
According to Dammann, with the adoption of a state of 
incorporation doctrine, "it is the law of the state of incorporation, rather 
than the law of the state in which the corporation's headquarters is 
located, that governs the corporation's internal affairs. "50 Dammann 
goes on to explain that under the real state doctrine, corporations could 
not choose the law of another EU Member State unless they were 
willing to move headquarters. Thus, "because the costs of such a move 
usually outweighed the advantages connected with a more efficient 
corporate law, the real seat doctrine effectively prevented free choice."51 
Id. 
very much. In the face of positive transaction costs, however, the default rules begin 
to matter very much. Indeed, if transaction costs are very high, bargaining around 
the rule may become effectively impossible. In such settings, identifying the party 
for whom getting its way has the highest value becomes the crucial question .... 
We therefore perform a thought experiment: "If the parties could costlessly bargain 
over the question, which rule would they adopt?", and then adopt that bargain as the 
corporate law default rule. 
48. For discussion of the law as a product, see Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: 
Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. ECON & ORG 225-53 (1985); Roberta 
Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L. 
J. 2359 (1997-98); see also Oren Bar-Gill, Michael Barzuza & Lucian Bebchuk, The Market 
for Corporate Law (Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Econ., and Bus., Discussion 
Paper No. 377, July 2002); Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of 
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984). 
49. See, e.g., Martin Gelter, The Structure of Regulatory Competition in European 
Corporate Law, 2 J. CORP. LAW STUDIES_(2005); see also Robert Drury, A European Look 
at the American Experience of the Delaware Syndrome, 5 J. CORP. LAW STUDIES_(2005); 
John Armour, Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation versus Regulatory 
Competition, (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 5412005, 2005); Jens 
Dammann, A New Approach to Corporate Choice of Law, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51, 
56 (2005). "Three decisions by the European Court of Justice - Centros, Uberseering and 
Inspire Art ... is incompatible with the Freedom of Establishment guaranteed by the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community (TEC)." Id. 
50. Dammann, supra note 49, at 53. 
51. Id. at 55. See also Jens C. Dammann, Freedom of Choice in European Corporate 
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5. Economic Analysis of Takeovers and the "Market for Corporate 
Control" 
Economic analysis of corporate law has become an incredibly 
specialized branch of law and economics over the last few decades. 
Over this time, there has been a major focus on applying the tools of 
economics to a particular branch of corporate law- the rules regulating 
takeover-style corporate control transactions. 
This application of economic analysis was kicked off largely by a 
paper published in 1965 by law professor Henry Manne. 52 In this paper, 
Manne introduced the concept of a "market for corporate control" which 
could discipline directors and managers, and work to align their 
interests with the interests of shareholders. 53 
Until this time, corporate control transactions were examined 
solely in terms of antitrust (competition) implications, rather than their 
impact on the internal governance arrangements of a corporation. 
Ford's Principles of Corporations Law provides a useful account of the 
thinking behind the market for corporate control, identifying reasons for 
and against regulation where company management succeeds or fails in 
achieving efficiency. 54 
Law, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 477, 479-82 (2004); Carsten Frost, Transfer a/Company's Seat-
An Unfolding Story in Europe, 36 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 359, 364-69, 374 (2005) 
("One crucial consequence of the . .. ECJ judgments is that founders within the EU are now 
free to choose the company law they prefer."); Andrea J. Gildea, Uberseeing: A European 
Company Passport, 30 BROOK. J. lNT'L L. 257 (2004). 
52. See Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. Eco. 
110 (1965); William J. Camey, The Legacy of the "Market for Corporate Control" and the 
Origins of the Theory of the Firm, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 215 (1999) (describing the 
origins of the market for corporate control, and Henry Manne's contribution to the law and 
to economics); Kenneth Lehn, The Market for Corporate Control: Some Observations on 
Henry Manne 's Contribution to Financial Economics, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 263 (1999). 
53. Id. at 112, 113. He famously stated that, "[t]he lower the stock price, relative to 
what it could be with more efficient management, the more attractive the take-over becomes 
to those who believe that they can manage the company more efficiently." Id. See George 
Bittlingmayer, The Market for Corporate Control, in ENCYCLOPEDIA L. & ECON., 725, 730 
(1999) ("Though control transactions have a long history in fact and in law, the academic 
literature on the 'market for corporate control' and indeed the term itself begin with Henry 
Manne ( 1965). His analysis focused on control transactions that would address the problem 
of poor management ... Manne also argued that control of the corporation was a valuable 
asset, and he advanced the idea of a 'positive correlation between corporate managerial 
efficiency and the market price of shares."'). 
54. R p AUSTIN & I. M. RAMSAY, FORD'S PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATIONS LAW sec. 
23.060 (12th ed. 2005). 
Some commentators maintain that there is a market for corporate control which 
provides an effective mechanism for correcting bad management. If a company is 
badly managed, its shares will not reflect the company's true value. If the market 
for corporate control is efficient, control will pass to an entrepreneur who is 
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According to Ford's, due to this potential market for corporate 
control, "[t]he imposition of any additional layer of regulation is 
controversial. "55 
In a now classic paper on corporate control transactions, 
Easterbrook and Fischel also explore how an unregulated market for 
corporate control will reduce agency costs to shareholders and, thus, 
increase the value of assets.56 
Another useful commentary on the function of the market for 
corporate control was provided recently by Stephen Bainbridge in the 
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law. The market for corporate control, 
according to Bainbridge, "is the ultimate monitor that makes the modem 
business corporation feasible" to the extent that potential unsolicited 
bidders have the incentive to investigate managerial inefficiencies 
resulting in a depressed stock price.57 
Id. 
prepared to replace the inefficient managers and thereby create an environment in 
which shares will be fully valued. Regulation necessarily interferes with the 
efficient operation of the market for corporate control, and on this view regulation is 
consequently undesirable. . . . Others argue that in the absence of regulation, 
shareholders of the target company are likely to be disadvantaged by a change of 
control. Small shareholders are particularly at risk, because control of the target 
may pass when the offeror purchases the holdings of a small number of large 
shareholders at premium prices, and small shareholders may have no opportunity to 
sell .... An intermediate position is to contend that takeover law should be optional 
to the limited extent that shareholders should be entitled to decide whether their 
company should be subject to particular mandatory rules. 
55. Id. Troy Paredes also had commented on the regulatory implications of an active 
market for corporate control that: 
Corporate law is an important part of corporate governance, but so are markets. It has long 
been argued that an active market for corporate control disciplines directors and officers to 
run the business profitably .... [Further, a] robust takeover market should hold directors and 
officers more accountable for their actions and, hopefully, curb any future outbreaks of 
greed, disloyalty, and mismanagement on the scale of recent abuses. 
Troy Paredes, The Firm and the Nature of Control: Towards a Theory of Takeover Law, 29 
lOWAJ. CORP. L. 103, 177-78 (2003). 
56. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 
YALE L.J. 698, 701 (1982) ("[T]he threat of sales of corporate control induces managers to 
perform well in order to keep their positions."). 
Corporate control transactions can reduce agency costs if better managers obtain 
control of the firm's assets or if they alter the incentive structure facing existing 
managers. Corporate takeovers, and subsequent changes in management, increase 
the wealth of investors .... [F]ree transferability of corporate control, like any other 
type of voluntary exchange, moves assets to higher valued uses. 
Id. at 705. 
57. Stephen Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Direct Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 
DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2006) available at 
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=796224#PaperDownload 
[B]ecause keeping the stock price up is the best defense managers have against 
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It is also useful to consider the impact of the recognition of a 
market for corporate control in terms of corporate governance in 
general. In an article published in 2003, David Westbrook did exactly 
that, explaining how, in the takeover market, the interests of profit-
seeking shareholders diverge from those of inefficient managers. 58 
This thinking on the market for corporate control, and the 
economic analysis of corporate law and takeovers regulation, will be 
applied in subsequent sections to promote a more marketable and 
effective regime for regulating takeovers in Australia. It will be 
explained that there is the potential to approach Chapter 6 of the 
Corporations Act, and § 611 (7) in particular, will give greater 
recognition to the market for corporate control and instill more 
flexibility in the market. 
E. The Brilliance of U.S. Takeovers Regulation 
In relation to U.S. takeovers regulation, there is an emphasis on 
building a culture of disclosure, complemented by corporate law rules, 
rather than treating takeovers as a hotbed for regulation. U.S. takeovers 
law is based on a similar governing objective as Australian corporate 
law (in particular that there be an efficient, competitive and informed 
market for corporate control), but with less in the way of black-letter 
law - particularly at the federal level. This is despite the U.S. having an 
Id. 
being disciplined by an outside searcher, the market for corporate control - more 
specifically, the unsolicited tender offer - is an important mechanism for preventing 
shirking by top management. Indeed, some would argue, the market for corporate 
control is the ultimate monitor that makes the modem business corporation 
feasible .... If close examination by a prospective bidder reveals that the declining 
market price is in fact attributable to shirking by the top management team, 
however, a disciplinary takeover could produce real gains for division between the 
targets shareholders and the successful acquirer. This prospect creates positive 
incentives for potential bidders to investigate when the market signals a firm is in 
distress. 
58. David A. Westbrook, Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility of a Capitalist 
Re-imagination, 92 GEO. L.J. 61, 102 (2003). 
Id. 
If Berle and Means inaugurated an era of corporate doctrine focused on the 
separation of ownership and management and management's ability to abuse 
shareholder interests, then Henry Manne may be said to have inaugurated the next 
orthodoxy. At least since Manne' s work in the 1960s, corporate governance has 
been understood as a commodity, regulated, like other commodities, by market 
mechanisms. In particular, Manne and his many epigones taught that managers 
were not free to do as they pleased with shareholders' money but were constrained 
by market forces. There was a market for corporate control - it is, a takeover market 
- wayward managers could and would be ousted by profit-seeking shareholders. 
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economy, and a M&A market, many times the size of Australia's. 
According to Mannolini, the U.S. "predominantly employ rigorous 
mandatory disclosure and procedural requirements as restraints upon the 
agency problems inherent in the corporate contract."59 
As to the successful operation of a system of disclosure in the U.S., 
Cassidy and Chapple have usefully commented on the distinctions 
between the U.S. disclosure regime and that of Australia. They suggest 
that the more strict U.S. laws facilitate self-regulation and expedited 
disclosure, particularly when companies present bad news for 
shareholders. 60 
Before proceeding to detail the rules regulating corporate control 
transactions, an overview is useful. In his excellent casebook on 
companies and securities law, Paul Redmond summarizes the U.S. 
disclosure-based regime. 61 
In the U.S., federal law is essentially disclosure based while much 
state law is primarily concerned with protection of non-shareholder 
interests including management, employees and local community 
interests in takeovers; that is not the case with Delaware where many 
corporations are incorporated. In the U.S., there is a relatively greater 
freedom for both bidder and target management, and auctions for 
corporate control tend to be easier and more common. There is no 
direct counterpart to the equality of opportunity principle. The contest 
between bidder and target sometimes becomes a Hobbesian struggle, 
showing nature red in tooth and claw. 62 
59. Mannolini, supra note 7, at 358. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a 
Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047 (1995). 
60. Andrew Cassidy & Larelle Chapple, Australia's Corporate Disclosure Regime: 
Lessons from the U.S. Model, 15 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 81, 85 (2003). 
Id. 
The enforcement of disclosure rules is a significant difference between the 
disclosure regimes in the United States and Australia. In Australia criminal and civil 
actions (including civil penalties) for disclosure breaches are rare, which has 
resulted in less pressure on companies to provide timely and accurate information. 
In contrast, U.S. companies have a stronger incentive to disclose because they 
operate in a disclosure regime of strict enforcement, at least due to SEC enforcement 
mechanisms being supplanted by private enforcement of disclosure law . . . . The 
literature examining the US securities market suggests that strong enforcement of 
disclosure law encourages companies to increase the quality and timeliness of 
information presented to the market. Companies will preempt the announcement of 
bad news to avoid large stock price decline, and subsequent lawsuits on earnings 
announcement. 
61. See PAUL REDMOND, COMPANIES AND SECURITIES LAW: COMMENTARY AND 
MATERIALS 890 (4th ed., N.S.W.: Lawbook Co. 2001) (1998). 
62. Id. 
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As will be explained later, given the success of American 
takeovers law, there is little doubt that an international convergence in 
corporate law will lead to the Americanization of takeovers regulation. 
Australia's corporate law already has the infrastructure to embrace this 
convergence, without the need for radical and costly surgery in the form 
of law reform, ensuring that it remains a market leader in our region. 63 
Commentators such as Thomson and Mannolini contend that 
through convergence towards an Anglo-American model of corporate 
regulation, the dominant paradigm internationally will be economic 
efficiency. 64 Economic efficiency comes from product design and 
management so that customers entering the market are willing to 
transact. The prerequisite for an effective contract, as you may recall, is 
willingness to enter into legal relations. The concepts of product design 
and management, and their applicability to takeovers law, will be 
discussed in the next section. 
There has recently been a move in Europe to converge towards 
what can be considered an Anglo-American approach to takeovers 
regulation. 65 
Under the 13th Company Law Directive on Takeovers, which EU 
member states must now move to implement, contractual freedom 
through "opt in" and "opt out" arrangements will become an important 
feature of European takeovers law. Member states will be able to opt 
out of some of the more contentious aspects of the Takeovers Directive 
in their own domestic takeovers law. According to European law firm 
Eversheds, "[ t ]he compromise now incorporated in the Directive allows 
Member States to opt out of either or both of the prohibition on 
frustrating action and the 'break-through' provision, although any 
Member State that does so must permit individual companies to opt in 
again."66 
63. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 19 (talking about the competitive success 
of British and American corporations). There is talk of convergence in other contexts as 
well. Most famously, in his book, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992), Francis 
Fukuyama wrote that the only challenge before the world now is to forge a rational global 
order that accommodates humanity's restless desire for recognition with a return to chaos. 
FRANCIS FUKUY AMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN ( 1992). "History" is defined 
in the book to mean "clash of political ideologies." Id. 
64. See Mannolini, supra note 7, at 359; Robert B. Thompson, Takeover Regulation 
after the 'Convergence' of Corporate Law, 24 SYDNEYL REV. 323, 327 (2002). 
65. See Andrea Guaccero, Recent Developments in European Takeover and Corporate 
Law, 12 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 91, 92-93 (2004). 
66. Eversheds, The European Takeover Directive (Jan. 17, 2005), 
http://www.eversheds.com/uk/Home/N ews_room/Publications. page (select "Corporate" 
hyperlink; then follow article, title and publication date hyperlink). 
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The opt out component of the Takeovers Directive was introduced 
principally because of German objections to the proposed prohibition on 
frustrating action. 
Another strong sign that the European Takeovers Directive was 
heavily influenced by the regulation of corporate law in the U.S., and 
the U.S. economic analysis of law is paragraph 6 of the Preamble to the 
European Takeovers Directive, which very neatly sums up the vision 
underlying this article as to how takeovers regulation can be repackaged 
and more effectively marketed: "In order to be effective, takeover 
regulation should be flexible and capable of dealing with new 
circumstances as they arise and should accordingly provide for the 
possibility of exceptions and derogations. However, in applying any 
rules or exceptions laid down or in granting any derogations, 
supervisory authorities should respect certain general principles."67 
F. Explanation of US. Federal and State Takeovers Law 
What follows is a discussion of the mechanics of federal and state 
takeovers law. I have selected some of the best explanations of the law 
from recent journal articles, and provided extracts of these below. The 
focus in this article is on federal law, although adequate attention will 
be given to state law, particularly the law in Delaware where the 
majority of public corporations in the U.S. are incorporated. 
1. Federal Law- Tender Offers 
What I consider to be the best explanation of how tender offers, a 
device regulated by federal law, work was provided by Kwang-Rok 
Kim in an article published in the Paci.fie Rim Law & Policy Journal. 68 
According to Kim, changes in laws governing tender offers have 
promoted competition in the tender market by facilitating information 
flow and enlarging the duration of the process.69 
67. Council Directive 2004/25, pmbl., para. 6, 2004 O.J. (L 142) (EC) available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0025:EN:NOT 
[hereinafter 13th Company Law Directive on Takeover Bids]. See also Aditi Bagchi, The 
Political Economy of Merger Regulation, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (2005). 
68. Kwang-Rok Kim, The Tender Offer in Korea: An Analytic Comparison between 
Korea and the United States, 10 PAC. RIM L. & PoL'Y J. 497(2001). 
69. Id. at 499, 504-07, 508-11. According to Kim: 
Tender offers represent the most significant tactical development in the United 
States' corporate takeover arena, and have been the "hottest" subject in the legal 
world of corporations and securities for three decades. Prior to the passage of the 
Williams Act, bidders could make very short tender offers, lasting only several days. 
The Williams Act was passed in 1968, and exists today to ensure that shareholders 
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Kim goes on to discuss the mechanics of the federal tender offer: 
During the 1960s, tender offers, appeared in the United States, and 
now are widely regarded as "the most effective means ... for wresting 
control from a resisting management," as increasing numbers of 
investors have embarked on campaigns to acquire controlling stock 
interests in publicly-held corporations. In 1968, Congress passed the 
Williams Act as an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 ("Exchange Act"). 
The Williams Act added the following provisions to the Exchange 
Act. Section 13( d) of the Exchange Act is designed to provide 
shareholders with knowledge of potential purchasers' identities and 
intentions by requiring disclosure from all owners of greater than 5% 
of any class of securities. Section 13( e) limits an issuer in purchases 
of its own securities. The SEC occasionally uses Section 13( e) to 
"regulate self-tender offers, issuer repurchases in the open market, and 
going-private transactions." Section 14( d), the major provision 
affecting tender offers, requires any person who plans to make a 
of target companies have the information and time necessary to consider offers, that 
shareholders are treated equitably, and that a competitive balance is maintained 
between tender offerors and target companies. 
Id. at 499. See also Hui Huang, China's Takeover Law: a Comparative Analysis and 
Proposals for Reform, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 145, 166-67 (2005). 
Id. 
A cash tender offeror could operate in virtual secrecy like a corporate raider in the 
pre-Williams Act era because the law did not require that "[a cash tender offeror] 
disclose his identity, the source of his funds, who his associate were, or what he 
intended to do if he gained control of the corporation." The Williams Act was 
designed to protect investors by requiring sufficient information to be provided to 
enable them to make an informed decision with respect to a tender offer. It is the 
purpose of the Williams Act that the target company management adopt appropriate 
defensive tactics to increase the value to target shareholders. 
The objective of shareholder protection, however, may conflict with the economic 
objectives of efficiency in resource allocation to the extent that the rule would 
render the hostile takeover more difficult and thus diminish the contestability of 
takeovers. The substantial costs associated with information disclosure and tender 
offer rules, which are designed to protect investors, may effectively deter many 
takeovers that otherwise would have been launched. Furthermore, it is widely 
recognized that the target's management has the incentive to abuse defensive tactics 
with respect to hostile takeovers for the purpose of entrenchment. Some takeover 
defenses, which were originally designed as a means to protect target shareholders 
from raiders, have been found to be frequently misused by the target's management. 
For example, the target's management would use defensive measures to thwart a 
hostile takeover that would injure their interests, regardless of whether the takeover 
would be beneficial to the shareholders, resulting in the diminished contestability of 
takeovers. This problem has been at the heart of the discussion of takeover law and 
received a wide range of practical and academic attention. 
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tender offer to submit all materials used in connection with the tender 
offer to the SEC and to submit a disclosure statement similar to the 
one required by 13(d). Section 14(e) prohibits fraud and "material" 
misrepresentation in connection with a tender offer. Specifically, 
14( e) makes unlawful any untrue statement of material fact, any 
omission tending to make statements misleading, and any fraudulent, 
deceptive, or manipulative acts in connection with any tender offer. 
Section 14( e) also gives the SEC authority to define and prescribe 
means reasonably designed to prevent such acts. 70 
175 
More detail is also provided by Kim about the federal rules, 
including Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations, 
regulating tender offers. 71 A useful overview of the considerations and 
70. Kim, supra note 68, at 504-05. Kim continues: 
Although tender offers have proven to be a highly effective method of taking over 
corporations, neither the Exchange Act nor the primary SEC Rule applying to tender 
offers defines the meaning of the term "tender offer." However, a conventional 
tender offer in the United States, as defined by extensive case law, is a public offer 
or solicitation by a company, an individual or a group of persons to purchase during 
a fixed period of time all or a portion of a class or classes of securities of a publicly-
held corporation at a specified price or upon specified terms for cash and/or 
securities. 
The United States Supreme Court, in Blue Chip Stamps. V. Manor Drug Stores, 
stated that the analysis of the term "tender offer" should begin with the language of 
the Williams Act. However, the Williams Act lacks a definition provision. Under 
Section 3(b) of the Exchange Act, the SEC has the authority to define the term 
"tender offer." Various SEC proposals have suggested that Section 14(d) of the 
Exchange Act should apply in more specific circumstances. However, none of these 
proposals have been successful. Thus, it is necessary to examine the SEC's attempt 
to define the meaning of "tender offer," and therefore the applicability of Section 
14(d) disclosure requirements, through case law. 
Id. at 505-06, 508. 
71. Id. 526-27. 
In the United States, the Williams Act provides the basic framework for assessing 
disclosure obligations in the tender offer context. Section 14(d)(l) requires the 
tender offeror to prepare and file a Schedule 14D-1 before commencing a tender 
offer for more than 5% of a target company's stock. The disclosure required in 
Schedule 14D-1 begins with the disclosure required by Schedule 13D. 
1) SEC schedule 13D 
Under Section 13( d)( 1) of the Exchange Act, any person who directly or indirectly 
acquires more than 5% of any class of the securities registered pursuant to Section 
12 of the Exchange Act must file a Schedule 13D statement with the SEC. 
Moreover, the investor must send a copy of the 13D statement to the issuer of the 
securities in question and to each exchange where the securities were traded. The 
information that must be disclosed on the 13D includes facts about the security and 
the issuer, the identity and background of the purchaser, the source and the amount 
of the funds or other consideration used in the acquisition, the purpose of the 
transaction, the interest in the securities of the issuer, the contracts, arrangements, 
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procedures that arise in practice in relation to federal tender offers has 
been provided by Christopher A. Iacono.72 
understandings or relationships with respect to the securities of the issuer, and the 
materials to be filed as the exhibits. Although Section 13( d) does not expressly 
require disclosure of any intent to acquire control, disclosure of the "purpose of the 
transaction" has been augmented by SEC regulations to require disclosure of further 
information regarding the purchaser's future plans for the issuer. 
A loophole in Section 13( d) known as the ten-day window currently allows some 
abuse of the regulations by securities purchasers. During the ten-day period after a 
person crosses the 5% threshold of Section 13( d), thereby incurring disclosure 
obligations, the tender offeror may purchase securities up to an additional 20% of 
the class of the equity securities. By using this method, he might be able to pay less 
for that 25% stake than he would have to pay after his Schedule 13D disclosure. 
Consequently, the SEC would like to eliminate the "ten-day window" by requiring 
the tender offeror to file the day after buying his first 5% and prohibiting the tender 
offeror from buying any more shares until the filing has been completed. However, 
Congress has not acted on the SEC's request. 
2) SEC schedule 14D-l 
After nearly ten years of the federal tender offer regulation under the Williams Act, 
the SEC adopted a permanent tender offer disclosure schedule. SEC schedule 14D-
l mandates disclosure of substantially more information by the tender offeror than 
Schedule 13D. 
In addition to the information required by Schedule 13D, 14D-l requires disclosure 
of other specific items relating to the persons retained, employed, or to be 
compensated by the target company and the purchaser's financial statement and 
relationship with the target company. Further, as of a 1977 SEC Release, most 
tender offerors believe it is necessary to include their own financial statements in 
their Schedule 14D-l. This 1977 Release, which concerns Regulation 14D, states 
that all financial information must be included in a Schedule 14D-l when it is 
"material." Although the Release did not resolve all the ambiguities concerning 
materiality, it did point to several nonexclusive factors that the tender offeror should 
evaluate when disclosing financial information. Although case law provides few 
clear guidelines concerning disclosure requirements, courts have affirmed the 
heightened disclosure of 14D-l, reasoning that the required financial information 
may be material to a target shareholder in determining whether to tender because the 
shareholder may decide that it is more attractive to remain a minority shareholder 
under a new, and possibly more efficient, management. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
72. Christopher A. Iacono, Comment, Tender Offers and Short-Form Mergers by 
Controlling Shareholders Under Delaware Law: The "800-Pound Gorilla" Continues 
Unimpeded - In Re Pure Resources, Inc., Shareholders Litigation, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 645, 
648-51 (2003). 
Although the Williams Act does not define the term "tender offer", a tender offer is 
generally "an offer to shareholders of a corporation to purchase stock of that 
corporation." Often, the objective of the offer is to acquire control of that 
corporation. In return for the stock, the shareholder will usually receive as 
consideration either cash, stock, debentures, or stock warrants. Regardless of the 
consideration, typically a tender offer will be regarded as either friendly or 
unfriendly. A friendly offer is one where management of the target corporation (the 
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2. The State Law 
While tender offers are regulated at the federal level under the 
1934 Act and deal with issuer companies, there is also a body of 
takeovers law at the state level in the U.S. Furthermore, the federal and 
state laws are not necessarily removed from each other. There is a 
relationship between the two that adds some depth, but also interest, to 
the regulation of takeovers in the U.S. In looking at state regulation of 
takeovers law, the jurisdiction that commentators traditionally turn to 
corporation whose stock is being sought) supports the offer, negotiates the terms, 
and recommends the offer to the shareholders. In contrast, an unfriendly offer, 
usually referred to as a takeover or a hostile takeover, occurs when the acquiring 
corporation has received or anticipates opposition by management of the target 
corporation. Because of this resistance, the most effective way for a corporation to 
accomplish its objective is to make an attractive offer to shareholders of the target 
corporation. A takeover may prove quite difficult for the acquiring corporation 
because it is forced to finance costly publicity campaigns to attract public tenders 
and may have to prepare for possible litigation. 
The acquiring corporation may decide to make a tender offer to a specific target for 
a number of reasons. The corporation may have determined that the target is a good 
fit in terms of management compatibility that the two companies complement each 
other financially, or the target's potential has not been completely realized. Once 
the acquiring corporation determines that the potential target is a good purchase 
choice, it may directly approach the management of the target. Often prior to this, 
the acquiring corporation will attempt to buy stock in the target to secure itself a 
stronger bargaining position if its attempt at a friendly tender offer fails. If the 
corporation can obtain a majority of the shares and become the controlling 
shareholder prior to making a tender offer, the success of the offer is more likely. 
If the acquiring corporation foregoes making a direct approach to the target's board 
or that approach is rejected, it will then commence the tender offer. The tender offer 
is an important tool for an acquiring corporation because it is made with a time 
limitation and is directed toward the target's shareholders. There is no requirement 
that the board of the target corporation approve the terms and conditions of a tender 
offer. In contrast, a merger or sale of asset transactions must get the board of 
directors' approval and recommendation. 
Once a tender offer is made the target company must advise its shareholders of its 
position regarding the offer "no later than ten business days from the date the offer 
[was] 'first published, sent or given' to stockholders." Within that period, the 
target's board will review the offer with its advisors and may then recommend that 
the shareholders either reject or accept the offer, or advise them that they are unable 
to take a position on the offer. Regardless of their response to the offer, the target 
company must file their response in a Schedule 14D-9 form with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission prior to communicating it to its shareholders. As soon as the 
tender offer is made, however, the target's shareholders can choose to tender their 
shares immediately or wait for management's response. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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first is Delaware, as that is where the majority of public corporations are 
incorporated, and accordingly where there is an incredibly active market 
for corporate control. 
In relation to Delaware law, Iacono provides a useful account of 
the mechanics of takeovers transactions. 73 Iacono goes on, discussing 
73. Id. at 651-53. 
Before making the tender offer, the acquiring corporation decides what form the 
offer will take: a cash offer, a stock exchange offer, or a combination of the two. In 
a cash tender offer, the acquiring corporation offers the target's shareholders cash 
for their shares in the company. In an exchange offer, however, the acquiring 
corporation offers its own shares in exchange for those of the target. Depending on 
the timing of the offer and the financial condition of the acquiring corporation, a 
cash offer may be more attractive to the target's shareholders. 
Along with deciding the form of the offer, the acquiring corporation will determine 
the terms of the offer, including how many shares of the target's stock it wants 
acquire. The corporation will set a minimum or maximum amount of shares to 
acquire. If it is unsuccessful in obtaining that amount, the offer will be often 
withdrawn. A number of factors are considered when the corporation is determining 
the amount of shares to be sought, and sometimes it will set the number of shares at 
an amount that if successful, will allow it to complete a type of non-negotiated 
merger. 
Under Delaware law, this type of merger between a parent and a subsidiary is 
referred to as a short-form merger. When a controlling shareholder corporation 
makes a successful tender offer for the necessary shares of its subsidiary, it will then 
complete a short-form merger. 
B. Mechanics of a Short-Form Merger 
Section 253 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (Section 253) authorizes and 
outlines the procedure for a short-form merger between a parent and its subsidiary. 
To qualify under Section 253, a parent corporation must own at least ninety percent 
of the outstanding shares of each class of stock of its subsidiary. The purpose of 
Section 253 "is to provide a parent corporation a means to eliminate unilaterally the 
minority stockholders' interest in the enterprise," and the procedures of a short-form 
are simple. After acquiring the required number through the tender offer, the board 
of directors of the parent corporation first adopts a resolution stating their intention 
to perform the merger. Then, the parent corporation files with the Secretary of State 
a "certificate of ownership and merger" which states that the parent owns at least 
ninety percent of the outstanding shares of the subsidiary corporation. Once the 
certificate is filed the merger is effective. Any shareholders who did not tender their 
shares receive compensation for them when the merger is conducted. A short-form 
merger has no requirement that the shareholders of either the parent or the 
subsidiary approve the merger; therefore, the parent corporation encounters no 
resistance in completing the merger. 
C. Mechanics of a Section 251 Negotiated Merger 
Rather than attempting to acquire the minority shares of the subsidiary by making a 
tender offer followed by a short-form merger, the controlling corporation may 
proceed through a negotiated merger with its subsidiary. Section 251 of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law (Section 251) grants the authority for a 
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the different standards by which Delaware courts assess the 
involvement of coercion in takeovers transactions. 74 
Another interesting aspect of takeovers regulation at the state level, 
particularly in Delaware, is the development of standards of review by 
the courts when considering defensive tactics by management of target 
companies. The question is whether the defensive tactic is employed 
with the interests of the target company's shareholders in mind, or to 
protect the positions of management responsible for devising the 
defensive tactic. Huang has recently provided a useful summary of this 
contentious area of the law, highlighting the precarious responsibilities 
of the fiduciary. 75 
negotiated merger. Similar to a tender offer followed by a short-form merger, the 
result of the Section 251 merger is that the parent corporation absorbs the target; the 
target dissolves and the parent survives. The process of the negotiated merger, 
however, is extremely different from that of the tender offer/short-form merger. 
First, the board of both the parent corporation and the subsidiary must initiate the 
merger by adopting a plan of merger. The plan of merger outlines the terms and 
conditions of the merger, including the consideration that the target's shareholders 
will receive, such as shares of the parent corporation, or cash. After each 
corporation's board adopts the plan of merger, it is then submitted to the 
shareholders of both the parent and target. For the merger to be approved, a 
majority of the shares entitled to vote on the merger for each corporation must vote 
in its favor. Also unlike a tender offer, in a parent subsidiary merger, the controlling 
shareholders stand on both sides of the transaction. They are the parent acquiring 
corporation and the majority shareholder of the target. This presents an inherent 
conflict of interest because the minority shareholder will be forfeiting its shares for 
consideration, which is "determined as a result of a bargaining process in which the 
controlling shareholder [is] in a position to influence both bargaining parties." 
In both of the transactions discussed above, a tender offer followed by a short- form 
merger or a Section 251 negotiated merger, the controlling shareholder, the parent 
corporation, owes a fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders when executing 
either transaction .... 
Id. (citations omitted). 
74. Id. at 656-57. 
Delaware courts have applied a different and less exacting standard of review to 
tender offers made by controlling shareholders. In Solomon, the Delaware Supreme 
Court determined that absent coercion or materially false or misleading disclosures, 
a controlling shareholder is under no obligation to offer a certain price for the 
minority shares. The court recognized that tender offers are generally regarded as 
voluntary transactions; however, the court noted two situations where tender offers 
may be considered involuntary. The first is where the offer is coercive. The second 
is where the disclosures made by the controlling shareholders were materially false 
or misleading. If an offer is involuntary, then the court will apply the entire fairness 
standard. If neither coercion nor material non- disclosure are present, the tender 
off er will not be viewed under the exacting entire fairness standard. 
Iacono, supra note 72, at 656-57. See also Jason A. Gonzalez, Sunglasses: The Secret to 
Making Tender Offers Fashionable, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 335, 338-40 (2005). 
75. Huang, supra note 69, at 177-79. 
In the U.S. takeover defense regime, as represented by Delaware law, the directors 
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of target corporations are empowered to institute a wide variety of defensive 
measures in response to hostile takeovers. Obviously, target management enjoys 
substantial discretionary power. In order to prevent target management from 
abusing their power to take defensive measures (for the sole purpose of 
entrenchment), U.S. takeover law imposes levels of judicial review depending on the 
perceived possibility of management opportunism. When target management adopts 
a defensive measure against a hostile bid, Delaware law applies the "modified 
business judgment rule" under which the directors are required "to show that after a 
'good faith and reasonable investigation,' they saw a danger to corporate policy and 
effectiveness." In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court decided a leading case 
regarding takeover defenses: Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. In this case, the 
court made several important developments concerning the judicial review of target 
management's use of anti-takeover defenses. The court held that the board of the 
target corporation "has an obligation to determine whether the offer is in the best 
interests of the corporation and its shareholders." Having established this general 
principle, the court then proceeded to articulate the directors' duties in the context of 
takeovers. According to this case, the defendants, namely the target company 
directors, are now required to show ( 1) "that they had reasonable grounds for 
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed because of 
another person's stock ownership," and (2) that "it [the defensive measure] must be 
reasonable in relation to threat posed." It is worth noting here that the defendant, 
not the plaintiff, bears the burden of proof. This makes judicial review act as a 
deterrent to abusive use of takeover defenses. 
Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., further developed judicial 
review concerning the duties of target management when using defensive measures. 
Under Revlon, directors' duties will change once the board reasonably believes that 
the sale of the company is inevitable or the board takes steps to put the company up 
for sale. Upon this triggering situation, the directors must discharge their duties by 
obtaining the highest price for shareholders, rather than maintaining the corporate 
enterprise, and cannot adopt a defense for the purpose of giving absolute priority to 
a non-shareholder constituency. 
Thus, the defenses permitted by Unocal could be a breach of the directors' fiduciary 
duty if the company is in the same situation as Revlon. Two subsequent cases, 
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. and Paramount Communications, 
Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., offered some guide to distinguish defensive transactions 
that put a company into a Revlon situation from transactions that do not. If a 
transaction contemplates a change in control of the target company, for example, by 
selling a control block of the target's stock to a single person or corporation, then the 
Revlon duty would be imposed on the target's management, otherwise only the 
Unocal duty would apply. In short, under Delaware law, the use of defensive 
measures is a matter within the business discretion of the target's directors and 
officer. 
Id. (citations omitted). See also Bittlingmayer, supra note 53, at 732. 
State law affects the voting rights of shareholders, the duties of corporate directors, 
and the defensive tactics available to target management, for example. This 
influence over the mechanics of control ultimately affects the value of control. 
In contrast to state law, the influence of American federal law is less direct, though 
perhaps no less important. 
Bittlingmayer, supra note 53, at 732. 
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In relation to the law regulating defensive tactics in Delaware, 
another useful source is Stephen Bainbridge's recent article in the 
Harvard Law Review, which asserts that "the Delaware courts allow the 
target's board of directors a substantial gatekeeping role in unsolicited 
tender offers, which again is attributable to the court's recognition of 
the importance of preserving the board's authority."76 
II. THE WEIGHTY PRODUCT OF AUSTRALIAN TAKEOVERS LAW IN THE 
MARKET FOR CORPORA TE CONTROL 
A. Towards Effective Marketing of the Product of Takeovers Law 
As has already been explained, this article is not about achieving 
change through the conventional process of law reform, but rather the 
effective marketing of a product - Australian takeovers law. 
Given that this article is about marketing a product, and more 
specifically using principles of strategic marketing to manage the 
product of Australian takeovers law in the market for corporate control, 
we need to have at least a basic understanding of these concepts. 
1. Understanding of Marketing Generally 
In the field of marketing, there is an immense amount of material 
explaining this concept. According to Ulrich and Eppinger, marketing: 
(i) relates to interactions between firm and customer; (ii) facilitates 
identification of product opportunities, customer needs, and market 
segment definitions; and (iii) arranges for communication between firm 
and customer, sets price targets, and oversees product launch and 
promotion. 77 
In his text, Strategic Marketing Management, Lambin defines 
marketing as "the process of delivering to the market."78 Lambin 
conceives of marketing aspects, three-dimensionally: (i) active (the 
penetration of markets), (ii) analytic (the understanding of markets), and 
(iii) ideological (a market-oriented culture).79 
This article is concerned with both the analytic and ideological 
76. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 47, at 1748. See also Bainbridge, Unocal 
at 20, supra note 57; Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael J. Wachter, Corporate Policy and the 
Coherence of Delaware Takeover Law, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 523 (2003). 
77. KARL T. ULRICH & STEVEN D. EPPINGER, PRODUCT DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT 3 
(3d ed., 2004). 
78. JEAN-JACQUES LAMBIN, MARKET-DRIVEN MANAGEMENT: STRATEGIC AND 
OPERATIONAL MARKETING 7 (2000). 
79. Id. at 4. 
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aspects of marketing. It is about first understanding the market for 
corporate control, and then fostering the operation of the market through 
a more flexible and efficient approach to takeovers regulation. 
In this sense, the approach applied in this article involves being 
strategic in the way in which takeovers regulation is designed and 
presented to the market. It is about being strategic in relation to the 
regulation of takeovers, so that takeovers regulation is a more efficient 
and effective product in the market for corporate control. 
There is a discrete area of marketing known as "strategic 
marketing" which is devoted to dealing with products in this way. 
According to Lambin, "[t]he objectives of strategic marketing typically 
include: a systematic and continuous analysis of the needs and 
requirements of key customer groups and the design and production of a 
product. .. that will enable the company to service selected groups or 
segments more effectively than its competitors. "80 
2. Product Management 
A product is "anything . . . that might satisfy a want or need. "81 
Product management is a discrete and specialized area of marketing that 
"is a function within a company dealing with the planning or marketing 
of a product or family of products at all stages of the product lifecycle." 
82 
John Legge explains in his book, Product Management: Shaping 
the Competitive Edge, that "product managers ... play a key role in the 
success of the enterprises and in the promotion of growth in the wider 
economy. "83 
What this article is intending to do is set out a "product strategy"84 
for takeovers regulation in Australia, which will inject greater flexibility 
and efficiency into Australian takeovers regulation through product 
engineering, rather than law reform. 
We are concerned here with "product strategy" and development of 
a subtle process of "product engineering." Product management is about 
80. Id. at 6. 
81. Wikipedia, Product (Business), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Product_%28business%29 (last visited Dec. 5, 2006). 
82. Wikipedia, Product Management, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Product_management (last visited Dec. 5, 2006). 
83. JOHN LEGGE, PRODUCT MANAGEMENT: SHARPENING THE COMPETITIVE EDGE 1 
(1999). 
84. See DONALD R LEHMANN & RUSSELL s. WINER, PRODUCT MANAGEMENT Ch 8 (4th 
ed. 2005). 
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improving the "quality" of the particular product on offer.85 Improved 
"quality" is also an objective in this article - improving the quality of 
takeovers regulation without law reform. 
Legge explains that improving the quality of the "product," 
whether this be takeovers regulation or something else, comes from 
being innovative. According to Legge, "[i]nnovations that introduce 
new qualities of products [promote growth]. As with absolutely new 
products, the successful introduction of a new quality of an established 
product will attract customers, this time away from the old, lower value-
for-money product. "86 
In discussing the concept of quality, Legge provides credence to 
the Japanese technique of "quality function management." This derives 
from the idea that "quality means producing customer satisfaction, and 
the job of product development is to create (or 'deploy') product 
functions in order to create quality."87 
In applying principles and concepts in marketing to rethink how 
we should approach takeovers regulation, it is useful to think of 
takeovers regulation in Australia as being a "product" operating in a 
"contestable market."88 While the formal legal rules regulating 
corporate control transactions enjoy monopoly status in the market for 
corporate control (aside from the "competition" between Chapter 6 bids 
and schemes), it is important for the "product" to remain attractive 
through being efficient and effective. 
According to conventional economic theory, in some 
circumstances (private) monopolies are forced to behave as if they were 
subject to competition because of the risk of losing that monopoly to 
new entrants, or because of the availability in the longer term of 
substitutes in other markets. Approaching the regulation of takeovers as 
a product in such a contestable market may be useful to encourage 
innovation. 
Harvard Business School's Michael Porter wrote in his acclaimed 
book, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, that a government's role 
in a market is to act as "pusher" and "challenger" so that firms gain a 
85. See BEYOND BRANDING (Nicholas Ind, ed., 2003); ROBERT BLAICH & JANET 
BLAICH, PRODUCT DESIGN AND CORPORATE STRATEGY: MANAGING THE CONNECTION FOR 
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (1993); DONALD R. LEHMANN & RUSSELLS. WINER, PRODUCT 
MANAGEMENT (4th ed. 2001); ROBERT G. COOPER ET AL., PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT FOR 
NEW PRODUCTS (2d ed. 2001 ). 
86. LEGGE, supra note 83, at 5. 
87. Id. at 48. 
88. See, e.g. , WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN c. PANZAR & ROBERT D. WILLING, 
CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (rev. ed. 1988). 
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competitive edge. 89 
I believe that the government's role in the market for corporate 
control is as a "pusher" of a flexible and efficient product of takeovers 
regulation as if the takeover laws are a product in a contestable market 
(competing with the market itself). 
B. Honey, I Didn't Shrink the Takeovers Code: The Chapter 6 
Unfriendly Giant 
In other product markets, it is recognized that there is little virtue 
in producing a large and unwieldy product when a smaller design can 
achieve the same, or a substantially similar, function. Indeed, a smaller 
design usually makes the product more effective. 
Yet, in Australia we have a relatively enormous takeovers code 
(Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act) to regulate a relatively small market 
for corporate control. Applying a cost-benefit analysis and judging the 
regulation through the lens of economic efficiency, Australia's approach 
to takeovers regulation is troubling. 
Add to this the extra fact, discussed further below, that combined 
with the takeovers code, Australia has additional schemes of 
arrangement regime for regulating takeovers. Despite being placed in a 
separate part of the corporations legislation to the takeovers code, you 
would think that there is a fundamental justificatory reason why the 
corporate regulator, ASIC, has facilitated a dual system of takeovers 
regulation. But this assumption is wrong. 
While there are certain commercial benefits which can be derived 
from pursuing a scheme of arrangement compared to traveling down the 
takeovers code road, we should not assume that schemes are 
indispensable. They are not. 
Further below, it is suggested that the separate scheme of 
arrangement regime, as it operates in the market for corporate control, 
should be abandoned. This does not require legislative change, but a 
simple reversal of questionable ASIC policy that schemes can be used 
for takeovers. Accordingly, it is suggested that Chapter 6 should stand 
by itself as a single, self-contained product for regulating takeovers in 
the market for corporate control. 
This will not result in any disadvantage. All the commercial and 
regulatory benefits that schemes were thought to have in their exclusive 
domain will be maintained. There is no magic to a "scheme" that 
cannot be achieved through an alternative "arrangement." Indeed, more 
89. MICHAELE. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (2d. ed. 1998). 
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than this, as will be explained, all the benefits will be preserved, while 
some of the costs associated with schemes will be avoided. 
While the courts will no longer have a central role in the regulation 
of corporate control transactions, which they do at present for schemes 
of arrangement, it is envisaged that a makeover of the takeovers code, 
principally through improving the "quality" of § 611 (7) within Chapter 
6, will protect shareholders through a supervisory role by ASIC (which 
essentially already is in place in the schemes and takeovers process), 
and the jurisdiction of the Takeovers Panel when issues of control arise 
to hear and determine complaints of "unacceptable circumstances." 
1. Introduction to the Chapter 6 Code 
As to the basic principles of Australian takeovers regulation, 
contained in Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act, Ford's Principles of 
Corporations Law describes the parameters of corporate control and 
restructuring transactions.9° Ford's also explains how Chapter 6 will 
impose blanket prohibitions, under certain circumstances, subject to 
specific gateway procedures and exemptions.91 
The last gateway mentioned is the focus of this article, and will be 
explored in detail below when discussing § 611 (7) and how it can be 
used to inject greater flexibility into the market. The rest of Chapter 6, 
with its 50 odd sections taking up dozens of pages in the Corporations 
90. AUSTIN & RAMSAY, supra note 54, at 23.040. 
The takeovers which are regulated under Chapter6 of the Corporations Act are 
corporate control or restructuring transactions involving an acquisition of voting 
shares by a bidder in a target company which has more than 50 members. The 
policy reflected in the Corporations Act is that an acquisition which allows the 
bidder to influence more than 20% of the voting shares in the target should be 
subject to regulatory supervision. Once the bidder has reached the 20% threshold, 
further acquisitions should be supervised until 90% of the target has been acquired. 
Id. For a useful overview of the law regulating takeovers in Australia, see Tony Damian & 
Andrew Rich, Schemes, Takeovers and Himalayan Peaks: The Use of Schemes of 
Arrangement to Effect Change of Control Transactions 6-8 (2004); I. Renard & J.G. 
Santamaria, Takeovers and Reconstructions in Australia, looseleaf service. 
Id. 
91. See AUSTIN & RAMSAY, supra note 54, at 23.090. 
Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act seeks to regulate takeovers by imposing a blanket 
prohibition on acquisitions beyond the 20% threshold, unless certain gateways and 
exemptions are used. The principal (but by no means the only) means of lawfully 
exceeding the 20% threshold are: 
• by making offers under an off-market bid; 
• by making offers under a market bid; 
• by acquiring not more than 3% of the voting shares of the target in any 
period of six months; and 
• by making the takeover after shareholder approval. 
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Act, essentially builds on this position. 92 
2. Eggleston Principles 
The most important prov1s10n in Chapter 6 is § 605, which 
expresses the purposes of the Chapter, including the so-called 
'Eggleston principles. ' 93 These purposes form the basis for the specific 
provisions taking up the pages of Chapter 6, and also are consulted by 
the Takeovers Panel in determining whether to make a declaration of 
"unacceptable circumstances."94 The function of the Takeovers Panel in 
Australia is explained below. 
Ford's states that, "[m]uch of the statutory regulation is designed 
to ensure that the takeover bid proceeds in accordance with the 
Eggleston principles and in particular, that the target shareholders are 
accorded equality of opportunity."95 
The principles, known as the 'Eggleston principles,' emerged from 
recommendations in a 1969 report of the Company Law Advisory 
Committee, chaired by Richard Eggleston. 96 
Id. 
92. REDMOND, supra note 61, at 898. As Paul Redmond notes: 
The central provision in Australian takeover regulation, that gives technical effect to 
the regulatory goals, is contained in Section 606(1 ). However, the person may 
acquire the relevant interest under one of the exceptions set out in Section 611 
without contravening Section 606, Section 606(1)(A). The prohibition acts as a 
takeover threshold, stopping anyone crossing its barrier of 20 percent of voting 
power by share acquisition unless they do by means of one or more of the 
sanctioned paths each of which pays its respects to the Eggleston principles. 
Section 606(1) of the Act provides: 
A person must not acquire a relevant interest in issued voting shares in a company 
if: 
(a) the company is: 
(i) a listed company; or 
(ii) an unlisted company with more than 50 members; and 
(b) the person acquiring the interest does so through a transaction in relation to 
securities entered into by or on behalf of the person; and 
( c) because of the transaction, that person's or someone else's voting power in the 
company increases: 
(i) from 20% or below to more than 20%; or 
(ii) from a starting point that is above 20% and below 90% 
Corporations Act, 2001, § 606(1) (Austl.). 
93. REDMOND, supra note 61. 
94. See Benedict Sheehy, Australia's Eggleston Principles in Takeover Law: Social 
and Economic Sense?, 17 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 218 (2004). 
95. See AUSTIN & RAMSAY, supra note 54, at 23.350. For a useful discussion on the 
"principles shaping Australian takeover regulation," see also REDMOND, supra note 61, at 
887-89. 
96. See The PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., Co. LAW ADVISORY 
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Ford's also summarizes the purposes of Chapter 6, now expressed 
in § 602 of the Act. The authors comment that the purpose of Chapter 6 
is to ensure: (i) efficient, competitive, and informed market acquisitions; 
(ii) proper extent of disclosure and time to utilize the information; (iii) 
reasonable and equal participation, by voting shareholders, in the 
benefits accruing to them; and (iv) execution of appropriate 
procedures.97 
In the Australian Government's Co~orate Law Economic Reform 
Program (CLERP) 4 policy document,9 titled Corporate Control: A 
Better Environment for Productive Investment, released in 1997, it is 
stated that the "Eggleston principles provide the philosophical 
underpinning" for the current takeover rules.99 Redmond notes that the 
extent to which these principles have influenced Australian takeovers 
COMM. TO THE STANDING COMM. OF ATTY'S-GEN., 2D INTERIM REPORT, PARL. PAPER No. 43 
(1969), available at http://www.takeovers.gov.au/display.asp?ContentID=494 (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2006). See also AUSTIN & RAMSAY, supra note 54, at 23.060. Ford's comments 
that: 
Id. 
Id. 
The Eggleston Committee expressed the opinion that where there is a proposal 
pursuant to which a bidder would acquire a substantial interest, it is necessary to 
ensure that: 
(I) the shareholders are carefully informed, and in particular that they have 
knowledge of: 
(a) the bidder's identity; and 
(b) all matters which may be relevant to the merits of the proposal; 
(2) the shareholders have sufficient time reasonably to assess the merits of the 
proposal; and 
(3) as far as practicable, all shareholders have an equal opportunity to share in any 
benefits accruing to any shareholder under the proposal. [This is the most 
controversial part.]. 
97. AUSTIN & RAMSAY, supra note 54, at 23.080. Chapter 6 ensures: 
First ... that the acquisition of rights over voting shares takes place in an efficient, 
competitive and informed market. . . . Second, a purpose of Chapter6 is to ensure 
that the holders of shares and interests and also the directors of the company or the 
responsible entity for the scheme, know the identity of the person who proposes to 
acquire a substantial interest, have reasonable time to consider the proposal and are 
given enough information to enable them to assess the proposal's strengths and 
merits: s 602(b ) .... Third, it is a purpose of Chapter6 to ensure, as far as practical, 
that the holders of the relevant class of voting shares and interests all have a 
reasonable and equal opportunity to participate in any benefits accruing through the 
proposals: s 602(c) .... Finally, a purpose of Chapter6 is to ensure that "an 
appropriate procedure" is followed as a preliminary to compulsory acquisition of 
voting shares or interests of any other kind of securities under Part. 6A.1 s 602( d). 
98. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., CORPORATE CONTROL: A BETTER ENV'T FOR 
PRODUCTIVE INV. ( 1997), http://www. treasury. gov .au/ documents/284/PDF /full. pdf (last 
visited Nov. 24, 2006) [hereinafter CLERP 4 Policy]. 
99. Id. at 10. 
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laws, Ioo Justin Mannolini has also written that the principles arising out 
of the Eggleston report still provide the "conceptual grundnorm" for the 
operation of Australia's takeovers law.IOI 
3. The Protective Function of the Takeovers Panel 
An important feature of takeovers regulation in Australia is the role 
of the Takeovers Panel. The Takeovers Panel, constituted in its present 
form since 2000, endeavors to resolve disputes in a prompt and 
commercially-focused way. I02 It may also issue a declaration of 
"unacceptable circumstances" in relation to conduct involving a 
corporate control transaction- regardless of whether there is a breach of 
the takeovers legislation. I 03 
The principles contained in § 602 are at the heart of what the 
Takeovers Panel does. The Panel does, and must by law, tum to the 
principles in determining whether to issue a declaration of 
"unacceptable circumstances."104 Section 657 A(3) of the Corporations 
Act states that: 
[I]n exercising its powers under this section, the Panel: 
(a) must have regard to: 
(i) the purposes of this Chapter set out in section 602; 
(ii) the other provisions of this Chapter .... Ios 
The important part of § 657 A(l) states that: "[t]he Panel may 
declare circumstances in relation to the affairs of a company to be 
100. REDMOND, supra note 61, at 887-88 
These principles have had a profoundly shaping effect upon Australian takeover law, 
especially through their inclusion in the statement of the purposes of Chapter 6, 
namely, to ensure that acquisition of control over listed companies or those with 
more than 50 members, takes place in an efficient, competitive and informed market 
and conditions corresponding to the four Eggleston principles are satisfied whenever 
a person would acquire a substantial interest in the company: § 602. 
Id. See also id. at 889 ("The first three principles are essentially concerned with the bid 
process and protection again crude forms of coercion or deception. The fourth principle 
asserts the claims of distributive justice, in the sense of fair or equal treatment of target 
shareholders, against those of allocative efficiency."). 
101. Mannolini, supra note 7, at 33 7. 
102. See NICOLE E. CALLEJA, THE NEW TAKEOVERS PANEL: BETTER w A Y? 2 (2002). 
See also RODD LEVY, TAKEOVERS: LAW & STRATEGY ch. 17 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing 
powers of ASIC, the Takeovers Panel and the Court). See id. at 240-48, for a discussion of 
the Takeovers Panel. 
103. See CALLEJA, supra note 102. See also LEVY, supra note 102. 
104. See Corporations Act, 2001, No. 50, § 657A(3) (2001) (Austl.). 
105. Id. 
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unacceptable circumstances. Without limiting· this, the Panel may 
declare circumstances to be unacceptable circumstances whether or not 
the circumstances constitute a contravention of a provision of this 
Act." 106 This is very relevant conduct that occurs under the § 611(7) 
arrangement because of the emphasis in § 602 on investor protection. 
Section 657 A, and in particular the fact that the Panel can make a 
declaration of unacceptable circumstances even if the relevant conduct 
does not constitute a contravention of the Act, will become important 
when discussing the proposed reinvigoration of § 611 (7) below. The 
website of the Takeovers Panel (www.takeovers.gov.au) is also a useful 
source of information concerning the role of the Panel. 107 
In relation to § 657 A, mentioned above, and the Takeovers Panel's 
powers to issue a declaration of unacceptable circumstances, the Panel 
has issued a series of so-called "guidance notes" indicating how it 
intends to exercise its powers under the Act. Guidance Note 1, 
available on the Panel's website, outlines the factors to be considered by 
the Panel when determining whether to make a declaration of 
106. Id.§ 657A(l). 
107. Takeovers Panel Homepage, http://www.takeovers.gov.au/ (last visited Dec. 6, 
2006). On the website, it is explained that: 
The Takeovers Panel is the primary forum for resolving disputes about a takeover 
bid until the bid period has ended. The Panel is a peer review body, with part time 
members appointed from the active members of Australia's takeovers and business 
communities. 
The Panel is established under section 171 of the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission Act (the ASIC Act). It is given various powers under Part 
6.10 of the Corporations Act. 
The panel has the power to make orders to protect the rights of persons (especially 
target company shareholders) during a takeover bid and to ensure that a takeover bid 
proceeds (as far as possible) in a way that it would have procured if the unacceptable 
circumstances had not occurred. 
The policy principles that the Panel aims to advance are those set out in §602 of the 
Act. They essentially include the four 'Eggleston Principles' and an additional 
principal [sic] that the acquisition of control of listed companies or listed managed 
investment scheme, take place in an efficient, competitive and informed market. 
Takeovers Panel, About the Panel, http: //www.takeovers.gov.au/display.asp? 
ContentID=6 (last visited Dec. 6, 2006). According to the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Bill that established the reinvigorated Takeovers Panel, the 
intention was for the Panel to "take the place of the courts as the principal forum for 
resolving takeover disputes under the Corporations Law, with the exception of civil 
claims after a takeover has occurred and criminal prosecutions." House of 
Representative, Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act Explanatory 
Memorandum (Takeovers), 1999, at ~7.3 available at 
http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view .htm?DocID=NEM%2FEM 199959%2FNA T%2 
FA T0%2F00007 (last visited Dec. 6, 2006). 
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unacceptable circumstances. 108 
4. Takeovers and Corporate Law Economic Reform 
The reforms made to the Corporations Act in 2000, which involved 
a redrafting of Chapter 6 and the introduction of a reinvigorated 
Takeovers Panel, were explicitly designed to "simplify" the regulation 
of takeovers, and make takeovers regulation more "efficient." As has 
been pointed out numerous times to date, this is also the objective 
behind the ideas expressed in this article. 
The reform of the takeover provisions was regarded by the 
government as a fundamental part of its economic policy. This is 
because takeovers, and the potential for takeovers through an effective 
system of regulation, has a disciplining effect on management and 
therefore works to enhance efficiency. In applying economic 
considerations to the regulation of takeovers in Australia, the thinking in 
"law and economics," discussed earlier, becomes very relevant. 109 
The economic basis for the most recent renovation of the takeovers 
law, was explained in detail in the Department of Treasury's CLERP 4 
policy paper, which preceded the reforms. 110 According to the paper, 
the CLERP "brings an economic focus to corporate law reform and 
aims to ensure that the Corporations Law facilitates investment, while 
maintaining confidence in the business environment and protecting 
investors."111 
108. Takeover Panel, Guidance, Guidance Note I: unacceptable circumstances, 
http://www.takeovers.gov.au/display.asp?ContentID=837 (last visited Dec. 5, 2006) 
[hereinafter Guidance Note 1]. Further, it was stated that the Panel is to be a "specialist 
body largely comprised of takeover experts," who will resolve takeover disputes as quickly 
and effectively as possible, "on the basis of their commercial merits," and thereby minimize 
tactical litigation. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 107. See generally Emma 
Armson, An Empirical Study of the First Five Years of the Takeovers Panel, 27 SYDNEY. L. 
REV. 665 (2005); Emma Armson, The Australian Takeovers Panel: Commercial Body or 
Quasi-Court?, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 565 (2004). 
Id. 
109. AUSTIN & RAMSAY, supra note 54, at 23.080. According to FORD'S PRINCIPLES: 
... [t]he reform of the takeover provisions by the CLERP Act 1999 was regarded by 
the government as a fundamental part of its economic policies .... Takeovers were 
said to promote efficiency in the capital market because the threat of takeover 
provides a strong incentive for corporate management to use capital efficiently, and 
conversely, failure to use a company's capital efficiently is likely to be reflected in 
an under-performing share price and hence vulnerability to takeover. Consequently, 
it was said, if a takeover occurs, it should result in resources being allocated to a 
more productive use. 
110. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, supra note 98. 
111. Id. at 5. 
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Accepting the general economic approach underpinning the 
CLERP, the policy paper then focused on the Government's vision for 
takeovers regulation: 
This paper sets out proposals for reform of takeover[ s] regulation 
under the Corporations Law. The reforms aim to remove regulatory 
impediments to an efficient market for corporate control subject to 
ensuring a sound investor protection regime .... 
The basic objective of takeover regulation is to improve market 
efficiency. Specifically, regulation is directed at achieving an 
appropriate balance between encouraging efficient management and 
ensuring a sound investor protection regime, particularly for minority 
investors. . . . All regulation involves some cost and it is essential to 
ensure that the benefits from regulation outweigh consequential costs. 112 
C. Time to Clean Out The Attic: The Antiquated Schemes of 
Arrangement Regime 
As was noted above, the second (and probably less well known) 
part of the dual structure regulating corporate control transactions in 
Australia is the scheme of arrangement. While the use of schemes to 
effect corporate control transactions has grown over time, schemes are 
still more limited in scope because they can only be used in "friendly" 
mergers. Schemes cannot be used for so-called hostile takeovers. 
Hostile takeovers are still the exclusive domain of Chapter 6. 
According to Damian and Rich, in the four years from 1996 to 
1999, schemes constituted 40% of "friendly" deals (deals valued at over 
$200 million each). From 2000 to 2003, the proportion was 38%.113 
What follows is an explanation of the law regulating schemes, and 
how schemes are used for corporate control transactions. 
In the author's view, there is no mystery behind schemes of 
arrangement; 114 they are simply just another form of regulated 
agreement- this time, between a company and its shareholders, or 
between a company and its creditors. The focus in this article is on a 
shareholders' scheme of arrangement. 115 
In Australia, schemes of arrangement are regulated predominantly 
112. Id. at 5, 7. 
113. See DAMIAN & RICH, supra note 90, at 93. 
114. James McConvill, Schemes of Arrangement, Selective Buy-Backs & Village 
Roadshow 's Preference Share Tussle: Entering the Matrix, 2 MACQUARIE J. Bus. L. 203, 
205 (2005), available at http://www.law.mq.edu.au/html/MqJBL/vol2/vol2_9.pdf. 
115. For a useful discussion of the practical aspects of shareholder schemes, see 
DAMIAN & RICH, supra note 90, at ch. 5. 
39
McConvill: Getting A Good Buy With A Little Help From A Friend: Turning To T
Published by SURFACE, 2006
192 Syracuse J. lnt'l L. & Com. [Vol. 34: 153 
through Part 5 .1 of the Corporations Act, along with Regulation 5 .1 and 
Schedule 8, Part 3 of the Corporations Regulations (which sets down 
the procedural rules for the scheme ). 116 "Arrangement" is defined very 
widely for the purposes of the Corporations Act (section 9 talks of 
"arrang~ment" to include "a reorganization of [the] share capital of the 
body corporate by the consolidation of shares of different classes"). 117 
This essentially means any reorganization of the company affecting the 
rights or interests of shareholders, for which there are not special 
provisions in the Corporations Act dictating how this should be done. 118 
For instance, Part 2J of the Act, which deals with share buy-backs and 
reductions of capital, and § 254 H which regulates the conversion of all 
or any of a company's shares into larger or smaller amounts. 119 
In recent times, schemes of arrangement to achieve a merger of 
two companies have become more common. This is mainly due to the 
fact the offering company only has to achieve 75% of votes in support 
of the merger proposal to be legally entitled to acquire the shares of 
dissentient shareholders. However, with a formal takeover bid initiated 
under Chapter 6 of the Act, a bidder company has to achieve at least 
90% support in order to "mop up" the remaining shares pursuant to the 
compulsory acquisition provisions under Chapter 6A of the Act. 120 
A merger scheme of arrangement is an agreement between the 
target company, meaning the company proposed to be acquired, and its 
shareholders. Usually, the offeror company is substantially involved in 
the merger. The shareholders agree to be issued with shares in the 
offeror company, often along with a certain cash amount or some other 
monetary arrangement, as consideration for the cancellation of their 
shares in the target company. 121 Because a merger scheme is structured 
in this way, it is only available for "friendly" mergers because the target 
116. Corporations Act, 2001, pt. 5.1 (Austl.); Corporations Regulations, 2001, pt. 5.1, 
sched. 8, pt. 3 (Austl.). 
117. Corporations Act, 2001, § 9 (Aust!.); see also Re NRMA Ltd. (2000) 33 A.C.S.R. 
595, 606 (N.S.W.) (referring to comments of Santow J as to the wide scope of 
"arrangement"). 
118. See Australian Sec. Comm'n v. Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd. (1993) 177 C.L.R. 
485 ; see also Kanaga Dharmanada & Justin Harris, End of the Schemer's Scheme: 
Limitations on Use of Schemes of Arrangements, 14 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 509 ( 1996). 
119. Corporations Act, supra note 116, pt. 2J, § 254 H. 
120. For a recent discussion of the operation of Chapter 6A, see Joylon Rogers, 
Compulsory Acquisition under Part 6A.2 and its implications for Minority Shareholders, 31 
AUSTL. Bus. L. REV. 97 (2003); Glenn Hughes, Compulsory Acquisition of Minority 
Shareholders' Interests, 18 COMPANY & SEC. L. J. 197 (2000). 
121. See also Alberto Colla, Schemes of Arrangement as an Alternative to Friendly 
Takeover Schemes: Recent Developments, 16 COMPANY & SEC. L. J. 365 (1998). 
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board must agree to put the resolution to its shareholders. 
Schemes of arrangement can also be used for "de-mergers" (also 
referred to as "spin-offs") whereby the shareholders of a large company 
agree for the company to be divided into two or more separate 
companies. The purpose of de-mergers is to "unlock" hidden value in 
the company and to establish companies with particular areas of 
specialization. Examples of where schemes of arrangement were used 
for this purpose include the WMC de-merger in 2002 and the AMP de-
merger in 2003. 
Schemes of arrangement are typically used by companies when 
there is a risk that not all shareholders will support the particular 
reorganization that is proposed. For a scheme of arrangement to come 
into force, it is only necessary for 75% of the votes cast at a scheme 
meeting to support the proposal. 122 
The procedural requirements which govern a shareholders' scheme 
of arrangement are set down in § 411 of the Corporations Act. The key 
procedural feature of a scheme of arrangement, as highlighted by § 411, 
is that a scheme is heavily supervised by the Court. A company cannot 
hold a meeting of its shareholders to consider a scheme of arrangement, 
send out information to shareholders about the scheme of arrangement, 
or implement a scheme of arrangement, without the approval of the 
Court each time. Thus, the concept of "arrangement" is very flexible 
such that schemes of arrangement can be used for a wide range of 
purposes by companies because of the involvement of the court at each 
step of the § 411 process and because the work that must go into 
preparing the scheme so that the Court ultimately approves of it, 
schemes of arrangement can be an extremely costly and time-
consuming mechanism to effect a change of corporate control. 123 
Under § 411, the first step is for the company to prepare an 
explanatory statement (setting out, at the minimum, the matters listed in 
Schedule 8, Part 3 of the Corporations Regulations), to be included in a 
'scheme booklet' which is designed to assist shareholders by setting out 
all of the material information regarding the scheme and its effect on the 
shareholders. Often, a scheme booklet will include an "independent 
expert's report," which states whether or not (in the expert's opinion) 
the scheme is in the best interests of the company's shareholders. 
Regulations 8303-8306 of the Corporations Regulations require an 
expert's report to be prepared if the outside party is (e.g. the company 
122. COLLA, supra note 121. 
123. Id. 
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wanting to acquire the target) involved in a scheme has a 30% or more 
shareholding in the company, or if the outside company and the scheme 
company have common directors. 124 However, common practice is for 
a company to include such a report even if it is not required by law. 125 
Once prepared, this booklet is lodged with ASIC (at least 14 days 
before the first court hearing), who will review it to assess whether it 
complies with the requirements of the Act. Following this, a first court 
hearing is held, whereby the company asks the Court for an order 
permitting it to convene a shareholders' meeting to both consider and 
vote on the scheme. So long as all the necessary procedural and 
substantive steps have been complied with by the company, the Court 
will usually allow the company to convene a scheme meeting. 126 
The company must then send out a notice of meeting to 
shareholders, accompanied by a copy of the scheme booklet. So that 
shareholders are capable of consulting at the scheme meeting with other 
shareholders who have a sufficiently similar interest in the company to 
them, the company will arrange (where necessary) separate meetings for 
different classes of shareholders (e.g. ordinary shareholders, preference 
shareholders, option holders etc). This is because § 411 (1) of the Act 
speaks of a meeting of members or "classes of members" being held. 
The test for determining if shareholders are assembled into appropriate 
classes is whether the impact of the scheme on the legal rights of each 
particular group (as opposed to their commercial interests arising out of 
the scheme) is sufficiently similar to make it possible for them to 
consult together "with a view to their common interest."127 
The shareholders vote on the scheme at the court sanction meeting. 
For the resolution adopting the scheme to succeed, it must be approved 
by 50% or more of the number of shareholders present and voting, and 
by at least 7 5% of the votes cast on the resolution. If separate classes of 
shareholders have been arranged, then each class must approve the 
resolution by the "50% in number, 75% in value" test. 128 
124. Corporations Regulations, 2001, vol.IO, sched. 8, §§ 8303-8306 (Austl.), 
available at 
http://www.comlaw.gov .au/ComLaw /Legislation/LegislativelnstrumentCompilation l .nsf/fra 
melodgementattachments/83659C7 524 DCC7 53CA2571850004498B). 
125. See Alberto Colla, Has the Greenmailer Finally Been Eradicated from Australian 
Corporate Law?, 20 COMPANY & SEC. L. J. 318, 332 (2003) [hereinafter Greenmailer 
Eradication]; see also IAN RAMSAY, JON WEBSTER, LAURIE MCDONALD & GRANT MOODIE, 
EXPERTS' REPORTS IN CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS 4 (2003). 
126. Id. 
127. See Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodd (1892) 2 Q.B. 573, 583. 
128. See Greenmailer Eradication, supra note 125, at 332-33. 
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If the resolution is approved by the requisite numbers, the company 
then goes back to the Court for final approval of the scheme pursuant to 
§ 411(4)(b) of the Act. The Court will look at the extent of shareholder 
approval, and will consider whether the terms of the scheme are "fair 
and reasonable" based on the opinion of an "honest and intelligent" 
business person. 129 It is very, very rare for the court to reject a scheme 
where the "50% in number, 75% in value" test has clearly been satisfied 
- as it is hesitant to substitute its decision for the commercial decision 
made by the shareholders. 130 
An important point to note is that ASIC has a large role to play in 
relation to schemes. It invests a great deal of time and resources in 
examining the terms of the scheme and the requisite explanatory 
statement, and in making appropriate submissions to the Court. Once 
shareholders approve the scheme according to the requisite threshold, 
shareholders are bound by the arrangement. They cannot act 
inconsistently with the arrangement, and the company can mop up 
remaining shares through a simultaneous reduction of capital 
resolution. 131 
1. The Stupidity of§ 411 (17) 
A crazy thing about the operation of schemes in the context of 
control transactions is that the corporate regulator, ASIC, has sanctioned 
the regulation of takeovers through two separate mechanisms, Part 5 .1 
and Chapter 6, even though Chapter 6 is specially designed to regulate 
takeovers. 132 What makes this even crazier is that this dual system is 
allowed to go on, 133 but schemes are subject to, and cannot depart from, 
the protections in § 602. 134 This is because of§ 411 ( 17) of the Act. 135 
129. In re Chevron (Sydney) Ltd. (1963) V.R. 249. 
130. Greenmailer Eradication, supra note 125. 
131. See AUSTIN & RAMSAY, supra note 54, at 23.010. Ford's Principles of 
Corporations Law explains that: 
[t]ypically a scheme of arrangement is a plan by which a company is recognized in 
some way which affects members' rights or interests. The scheme typically has 
elements that are compulsory for members, such as a requirement that all members 
transfer their shares in exchange for shares in a new holding company: Re Victorian 
Grain Services Ltd (2000) 35 ACSR 198 .... 
Id. See Colla, Schemes of Arrangement, supra note 121 (overview of schemes); DAMIAN & 
RICH, supra note 90, at 8-20 (overview of the scheme procedure). 
132. See DAMIAN & RICH, supra note 90. 
133. The Australian Department of Treasury concluding in relation to schemes that: 
"The current approach to takeovers by scheme of arrangement should be retained. This 
would continue to allow schemes to be used to transfer control of a 'target' company to a 
'bidder' company." CLERP 4 Policy, supra note 98. 
134. Corporations Act, 2001, § 602 (Austl.). 
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Section 411 (17), which commenced on 1 July 1982, prevents the 
court from approving a scheme unless: 
(a) it is satisfied that the scheme has not been proposed for the purpose 
of enabling any person to avoid the operation of Chapter 6 (which 
regulates takeovers); or 
(b) the Commission states in writing to the court that it has no 
objection to the compromise or arrangement. The Court need not 
approve the scheme merely because of the Commission's statement. 136 
ASIC's position on the use of schemes in the context of takeovers 
is clarified to some extent in its Policy Statement 60, which has been 
applied since the early 1990s.137 
ASIC also states that, "many transactions which cannot be effected 
under a Chapter 6 takeover without modification may be effected under 
Chapter 5 or, simultaneously with a Chapter 5 resolution. 138 For 
example, the following transactions cannot be achieved by making 
takeover offers alone: 
(a) amendments of articles of association; 
(b) reductions of capital; 
( c) acquisitions of, and variation of the terms of, options and 
convertible securities."139 
When considering § 411(17), ASIC Policy Statement 142 is also 
relevant. Policy Statement 142 discusses that in relation to the ASIC 
statement under § 411 (17)(b) that ASIC has no objection to the scheme: 
135. Corporations Act, 2001, § 411 (17) (Austl.). 
136. Id. 
137. See ASIC, Policy Statement 60, PS 60.3 (Apr. 8, 1999), available at 
http://services.thomson.com.au/asic/ps/ps060.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2006) [hereinafter 
ASIC, Policy Statement 60]: 
ASIC's policy on transactions that can be conducted either as schemes or takeovers 
is that ASIC and the Law have no preference for these transactions being conducted 
one way or another. It is not the purpose of the Law to require persons to follow the 
procedures set out in Chapter6 (in preference to other regulated methods) in the case 
of all transactions involving acquisitions (In Re The Bank of Adelaide ( 1979) 22 
SASR 481; Re ACM Gold Ltd (1992) 7 ACSR 231; Re Stockbridge Ltd). 
There are recent cases which reflect the position expressed by ASIC in PS 60. See Re 
Equinox Resources Ltd, (2004) 49 ACSR 692, at 19 ("the takeovers provisions of Chapter6 
will not be regarded as having dominance over, or as automatically taking precedence over, 
the scheme provisions of Chapter5."). See also Re Crown Diamonds NL, (2005) W.A.S.C. 
93 (Austl.). 
138. ASIC, Policy Statement 60, supra note 137, at PS 60.4. 
139. Id. 
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ASIC is concerned to ensure that takeovers that operate by way of 
schemes of arrangement operate, and are regulated, in a manner which 
is harmonious with the provisions of Chapter 6. This requires that 
members receive all material information that they need for their 
decision, members receive reasonable and equal opportunity to share 
in the benefits provided under the scheme, and the meetings are 
properly conducted. ASIC will not provide a statement under § 
411 (7)(b) unless the scheme and its explanatory statement meet these 
conditions. 140 
In their recent monograph Schemes, Takeovers and Himalayan 
Peaks, Damian and Rich recommend that § 411 ( 17) be repealed so that 
schemes have a completely separate operation to Chapter 6 in the 
context of corporate control transactions. 141 It is my view, however, 
that schemes should no longer operate in the terrain covered by Chapter 
6. 
If§ 411 ( 17) is to be repealed, which this article is not suggesting, it 
should only be because schemes are no longer relevant to corporate 
control transactions. As will be explained in section four, while using 
schemes has certain benefits, these can be obtained through a self-
contained Chapter 6, which is reinvigorated through fresh thinking. 
Section 611 (7) of the Corporations Act is the key to making this 
happen. 
2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Schemes142 
It is noted below that I believe takeovers regulation in Australia 
can do without the involvement of schemes. Rather than have a dual 
regulatory scheme for corporate control transactions of schemes and 
formal Chapter 6 bids, I believe Chapter 6 should stand alone as a self-
contained mechanism. 
But if the use of schemes is so problematic in the context of 
corporate control transactions, why are they commonly used? There 
have been some attempts recently, in particular in the Damian and Rich 
monograph, to clearly identify the benefits of schemes. Some of the 
costs of using schemes have also been identified. These are pointed out 
below. 
140. ASIC, Policy Statement 142, PS 142.19 (Apr. 8, 1999), available at 
http://services.thompson.com.au/asic/ps/ps142.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2006). 
141. See DAMIAN & RICH, supra note 90, at Chapter 7. Damian and Rich also propose 
that the takeover disclosure requirements in Chapter 6 of the Act be incorporated into the 
scheme provisions in Part 5.1. 
142. Id. at 50-71 ("Comparing Schemes and Takeovers" and "When Schemes are 
Used") for detailed discussion. 
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a. Advantages of Schemes 
Some of the main advantages of schemes in corporate control 
transactions are: 
• Certainty- either the acquirer will get everything they 
want at the date of the final court hearing, or nothing at all. 
Situations do exist where achieving 100% ownership is a 
critical requirement for the bidder. This would occur in 
circumstances where tax savings and/or cost 
rationalizations are dependent upon 100% ownership (as 
opposed to merely majority ownership) of the entity. This 
is to be contrasted to a takeover bid under Chapter 6 where 
a bidder could fall far short of the threshold needed for 
compulsory acquisition (presently 90% ).143 
• Transparency- in the way schemes are structured and 
conducted. This is ensured through court involvement at 
each step of the scheme process. This can, however, also 
be seen as a disadvantage from the acquirer's perspective, 
due primarily to the class voting arrangement and the 
ability of the court to discount or disregard votes based on 
extrinsic interests in schemes. 144 
• Structural Flexibility- schemes can be used to achieve 
lots of different objectives (e.g., demerger of business units 
at the same time, buyback and return of franking credits). 
b. Disadvantages/Costs Associated with Schemes 
In the last major policy consideration of takeovers in Australia, the 
government's CLERP 4 policy paper included a summary of the 
advantages and disadvantages of schemes in corporate control 
transactions. According to this paper, "it has been argued that schemes 
are cumbersome, slow and costly, and may have less flexibility than 
takeover bids. For example, variations of a scheme require further court 
approval or even recommencement of the entire approval process. Thus 
it is extremely difficult for a bidder to increase the price offered under a 
scheme and this may have "devastating" consequences if a rival bidder 
143. In relation to a takeover bid pursuant to Chapter 6, § 661A(l) provides that the 
bidder may compulsorily acquire any securities in the bid class if inter alia they hold, during 
or at the end of the bid period, a relevant interest in at least 90% (by number) of the 
securities in the bid class. The provision further provides that the bidder must have acquired 
at least 75% (by number) of the securities that the bidder offered to acquire under the bid. 
Corporations Act 2001 § 661A(l) (Austl.). 
144. See DAMIAN & RICH, supra note 90, at 3. 
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offers a higher price."145 
Further, in terms of the limited use of schemes in corporate control 
transactions, the paper notes that, "schemes will only be viable 
alternatives to takeovers in a limited number of situations. For example, 
schemes would not be a viable alternative to a hostile or defended 
takeover bid, as it is the company which must bring the scheme before a 
court for approval. This will form a 'natural' hurdle to using schemes 
as an alternative to takeovers."146 
For a detailed account of the strengths and weaknesses of schemes 
in the context of corporate control transactions, readers are referred to 
Chapter five of the Damian and Rich monograph discussed above. 147 
D. Cleaning Up Takeovers Regulation: Removing the Dual System of 
Schemes and Chapter 6 Takeovers 
I believe that it is well and truly time to cleanse Australian 
takeovers regulation of the use of schemes. Notwithstanding § 411 ( 17) 
of the Corporations Act, schemes have traditionally been used to bypass 
Chapter 6, and to achieve certain commercial benefits not considered to 
be available when proceeding under Chapter 6. 
But the scheme regime in Part 5 .1 of the Corporations Act was 
never intended to give effect to a takeover. ASIC originally adopted a 
policy enabling schemes to be used for this purpose to facilitate 
takeovers of options and managed investment schemes that were outside 
the scope of Chapter 6. But the law has moved on, and Chapter 6 now 
specifically captures managed investment schemes (options are still 
outside Chapter 6, but can be converted to cover securities for the 
purposes of a friendly corporate control transaction). 
While ASIC's policy, expressed now in Policy Statement 60, was 
questionable to begin with, the retention of this policy now that Chapter 
6 has been amended is totally inappropriate. Sure, there are some 
commercial benefits of using a scheme rather than a formal Chapter 6 
bid in particular circumstances, but this does not give ASIC a license to 
radically alter the design of takeovers law in Australia. 
If it is still considered desirable to have available an "arrangement" 
for giving effect to a change of corporate control as an alternative to a 
formal takeover bid, I believe this can be facilitated through Chapter 6 
itself, rather than a regime outside of Chapter 6 that regulates a device-
145. CLERP 4 Policy Paper, supra note 98, at 53. 
146. Id. 
147. DAMIAN & RICH, supra note 90, at 82-93 (criticizing schemes). 
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the scheme of arrangement - which was not designed to deal with 
corporate control transactions. 
Chapter 6 can be used in this way without law reform. That is, it 
can be used in this way - now. The principal way in which this can be 
achieved is through an elevated use of § 611 (7), a provision which is 
quite unremarkable in appearance but can have remarkable implications. 
E. Section 611 (7) as the Mild-Mannered Hero 
As noted earlier, § 611 (7) is one of the "gateways" in Chapter 6 of 
the Corporations Act to enable a change of corporate control. 
Section 611(7)148 provides that an acquisition of a relevant interest 
in voting shares that was previously approved by resolution of the target 
company during a general meeting will be exempt from the general 
prohibition on corporate control in§ 606 so long as: 
(a) no votes are cast in favour of the resolution by: 
. h . k h . . . d h . . 149 L t e person proposmg to ma e t e acqms1tlon an t eir associates; or 
ii. the persons (if any) from whom the acquisition is to be made and their 
associates; (hereinafter referred to as "associated persons") and 
(b) the members of the company were given all information known to 
the person proposing to make the acquisition or their associates, or 
known to the company, that was material to the decision on how to 
vote on the resolution, including: 
i. the identity of the person proposing to make the acquisition and their 
associates; and 
ii. the maximum extent of the increase in that person's voting power in the 
company that would result from the acquisition; and 
iii. the voting power that person would have as a result of the acquisition; and 
iv. the maximum extent of the increase in the voting power of each of that 
person's associates that would result from the acquisition; and 
v. the votin~ .P.ow9r
5
giat each of that person's associates would have as a result 
of the acqms1tlon. 
The significance of § 611 (7) operating to enable shareholders to 
148. AUSTIN & RAMSAY, supra note 54, at 23.290. 
Item 7 of § 611 exempts an acquisition approved previously by resolution passed at 
a general meeting of the company in which the acquisition is made, provided that no 
votes are cast in favour of the resolution by the acquirer . . . or their respective 
associates. This enables the general body of shareholders to "opt out" of the 
statute's protection. 
Id.; AUSTRALIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FORMS AND PRECEDENTS, CORPORATIONS: TAKEOVERS 
1050 (Lewis A. Harris ed., Sydney, Butterworths 2d ed.) (1963) ("in order to satisfy the 
prerequisites of § 611(7), the shareholders of Target must be in a position to make an 
informed decision on the acquisition and therefore need a full and frank disclosure of all the 
relevant facts."). 
149. Corporations Act, 2001 § 12 (Austl.) (defining the term "associate"). 
150. Corporations Act, 2001, § 611(7) (Austl.). 
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"opt out" of the formalities in Chapter 6 will be explored below. 
ASIC's Policy Statement 74 (titled "Acquisitions Agreed to by 
Shareholders") was issued in 1993, in an attempt by ASIC to provide 
practical guidance about issues pertaining to § 611(7). 151 Policy 
Statements 74.5 and 74.6 deal with the proper and full disclosure the 
target company must provide shareholders. 
[74.5] Section 623 [now § 611(7)] assumes that the directors of a 
company will provide shareholders with proper and full disclosure to 
enable them to assess the merits of the proposals and decide whether to 
agree by resolution to an acquisition of shares. 1 2 
[74.6] Directors need to ensure all relevant facts related to the 
proposal are disclosed but should ensure all matters are disclosed that 
are material and necessary for the shareholders to make an informed 
decision on the resolution put to the meeting. 153 
Policy Statement 74.8 also lists the information which case law 
indicates shareholders are entitled. 
[PS 74.8] Current case law indicates that shareholders of a company 
are entitled, as a minimum, to the following information in the notice 
of a § 623 resolution or the accompanying explanatory memorandum: 
(a) the identity of the allottee or purchaser and any person who will 
have a relevant interest in the shares to be allotted or purchased; 
(b) full particulars (including the number and the percentage) of the 
shares in the company to which the allotee or purchaser is or will be 
entitled immediately before and after the proposed acquisition; 
(c) the identity, associations (with the allottee, purchaser or vendor, 
and with any of their associates) and qualifications of any person who 
it is intended will become a director if shareholders agree to the 
allotment or purchase; 
( d) a statement of the allotee' s or purchaser's intentions regarding the 
future of the company if shareholders agree to the allotment or 
purchase, and in particular: 
(i) any intention to change the business of the company; 
(ii) any intention to inject further capital into the company, and if so how; 
(iii) the future employment of the present employees of the company; 
151. AUSTL. SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS COMM'N, POLICY STATEMENT 74, 
ACQUISITIONS AGREED TO BY SHAREHOLDERS, (Aug. 12, 1993), available at 
http://services.thomson.com.au/asic/ps/ps074.pdf (last [hereinafter ASIC, Policy Statement 
74]. 
152. Id. at 74.5. 
153. Id. at 74.6. 
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(iv) any proposal whereby any property will be transferred between the company 
and the allottee, vendor or purchaser or any person associated with any of them; 
and 
(v) any intention to otherwise redeploy the fixed assets of the company; 
( e) particulars of the terms of the proposed allotment or purchase and 
any other contract or proposed contract between the allotee or 
purchaser and the company or vendor or any of their associates which 
is conditional upon, or directly or indirectly dependent on, 
shareholders' agreement to the allotment or purchase; 
( t) when the allotment is to be made or the purchase is to be 
completed; 
(g) an explanation of the reasons for any proposed allotment; 
(h) the interests of the directors in the resolution; and 
(i) in the case of a listed company, any additional information that the 
Listing Rules require to be disclosed. 
See NCSC v Consolidated Gold Mining Areas NL (1985) 3 ACLC 
520; Devereaux Holdings Pty Ltd v Pelsart Resources NL (1985) 9 
ACLR 880; Darvall v North Sydney Brick & Tile Co Ltd (1989) 7 
ACLC 81; Southern Resources Ltd v Residues Treatment & Trading Co 
Ltd (1988) 6 ACLC 913; and§ 73l(a) and (c) of the Law. 154 
Policy Statement 74.9 goes on to state that it is ASIC's position 
that shareholders of the target company should be provided with the 
following information (by the target company or by the acquiring 
company): 
[PS 74.9] Shareholders of a company should also be provided with: 
(a) the identity of the directors who approved or voted against the 
proposal to put the resolution to shareholders and the relevant 
information memorandum; 
(b) the recommendation or otherwise of each director as to whether 
non-associated shareholders should agree to the acquisition, and the 
reasons for that recommendation or otherwise; 
( c) any intention of the acquirer to change significantly the financial or 
dividend policies of the company; and 
( d) an analysis of whether the proposal is fair and reasonable when 
considered in the context of the interests of, the shareholders other 
than those involved in the proposed allotment or purchase or 
154. Id. at 74.8. 
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associated with such persons ("non-associated shareholders") (see ,-i,-r 
11-31). 155 
Policy Statement 7 4 also comprehensively deals with the issues 
arising from the acquiring company negotiating an agreement prior to 
the resolution being put to the target company's shareholders in 
accordance with § 611(7). ASIC is prepared to modify § 611(7) where 
necessary in order to remove doubt that the terms of the proposed 
contract or agreement may be discussed and agreed upon subject to 
certain conditions. 156 This is because the wording of§ 608(8) of the 
Corporations Act leaves it open to doubt that such an in-principle 
agreement would give rise to an "accelerated relevant interest."157 
ASIC' s main Policy Statement on takeovers, Policy Statement 171, 
also provides some information on how ASIC intends to administer § 
611(7). The relevant parts are PS [171.54] and [171.56], extracted 
below: 
PS [ 171.54]: We may give case-by-case relief for an acquisition 
approved by a resolution passed at a general meeting of the company 
under item 7 of § 611. This relief would be from the requirement to 
give all information known to an associate of the person proposing to 
acquire in item 7(b ). The acquirer must show that they have requested 
information from their associate, but cannot reasonably obtain it. 158 
PS [171.56]: An acquisition approved previously by a resolution 
passed at a general meeting of the company in which the acquisition is 
made is exempt from the prohibition in § 606: item 7 of§ 611. For 
the exemption to apply, the members of the company must be given 
all information known to the acquirer or their associates that was 
material to the decision on how to vote on the resolution: item 7(b ). 159 
Ford's, in a statement quoted earlier, notes that § 611(7) can be 
155. Id. at74.9. 
156. Id. at 74.47. 
157. ASIC, Policy Statement 74, supra note 137, at 74.44. The Policy Statement 
further provides that such doubt would exist, even if "the sale would only be executed, or 
the power to vote would only be given, once the proposed agreement has been agreed to by 
non-associated shareholders." Id. In Policy Statement 74, ASIC also states that it wishes to 
administer the law so as to give effect to what it sees as the implied limitation of§ 608(8), to 
promote the practical operation of § 611 (7) in order to give effect to "its purpose of 
promoting business efficiency and certainty, and [to protect] the interests of minority 
shareholders." Id. at 74.46. 
158. AUSTL. SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS COMM'N, POLICY STATEMENT 171, 
ACQUISITIONS AGREED TO BY SHAREHOLDERS, (June 6, 2004), at 171.54 available at 
http://services.thomson.com.au/asic/ps/ps074.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2006) [hereinafter 
ASIC, Policy Statement 171]. 
159. Id. at 171.56. 
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used so that the target company shareholders can "opt out" of the 
formalities of a Chapter 6 bid. This provides for the kind of flexibility 
and efficiency in takeovers regulation that "law and economics" 
commentators advocate. Rigid, complex, burdensome regulation 
operates to distort the market for corporate control, which works to 
effectively price control so that it is allocated to whom ever values that 
control most. 
But what we can see as a major limitation with § 611 ( 17) is that 
only non-associated shareholders, those whose shares aren't being 
acquired or who are not the acquirers, can vote. Section 611 (7) would 
have much greater impact if associated shareholders could also vote. 
Section 611 (7) would also be more significant if it could be used for 
hostile takeovers- enabling the acquiring company to put the resolution 
to target company shareholders. 
As will be explained in the next section, there are mechanisms in 
place in the Corporations Act to enable this to happen. There are also 
examples where § 611 (7) has been used in this way (at this stage, to 
enable associated shareholders to vote). 
It is argued in the next section that § 611 (7) should be utilized 
more regularly to promote a flexible and efficient system of takeovers 
regulation. The discussion of the economic analysis of law, and utility 
of limited regulation in the market for corporate control, highlights the 
importance of promoting this approach to takeovers regulation. 
Further, a§ 611(7) arrangement can provide for all the commercial 
benefits of a scheme of arrangement but without the costs associated 
with schemes. It is therefore time for § 611 (7) to be marketed 
effectively. 
III. MARKETING THE PRODUCT OF TAKEOVERS LAW 
There are risks and costs to a program of action. But they are far less 
than the long-range risks and costs of comfortable inaction. 
Our problems are man-made, therefore they may be solved by man. 
And man can be as bi~ as he wants. No problem of human destiny is 
beyond human beings. 60 
- John F. Kennedy 
160. The Quotations Page, Quotations by Author - John F. Kennedy, 
http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/John_F._Kennedy/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2006). 
52
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 34, No. 1 [2006], Art. 5
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol34/iss1/5
2006] Applicability of U.S. Takeovers Laws in Australia 205 
A. The Genius of AS/C's Exemption and Modification Power 
It was explained in the last section that takeovers regulation in 
Australia could be made more flexible and efficient through directing 
our attention to § 611 (7) of the Act. Section 611 (7) has enormous 
potential. It can provide for a self-contained code, in the form of 
Chapter 6, for the regulation of takeovers, rather than the present dual 
regulatory structure of formal Chapter 6 bids and schemes of 
arrangement, located outside of Chapter 6. 
This elevation of § 611 (7) can be achieved without law reform. It 
was explained that the mechanism to achieve this flexibility and 
efficiency already exists in the Corporations Act. Instead, what is 
required is fresh thinking about, and effective marketing of, takeovers 
regulation in Australia. The market for corporate control needs to be 
given greater recognition, and the assumption that formal rules are the 
optimal method of improving regulation needs to put into the dustbin. 
But what is this "mechanism" that can generate greater flexibility 
and efficiency? Section 611 (7) is expressly limited in its operation so 
that only non-associated shareholders can vote on a resolution. So how 
can § 611 (7) step up to the task? 
Further, even if § 611 (7) is capable of stepping up to improve the 
efficiency of takeovers regulation, is this desirable? While the 
regulatory hurdles to a takeover may be lowered, what about the 
existing protections in place to look after vulnerable shareholders? Are 
these protections part of the detailed rules that will be washed away 
with the tide of regulatory reform? 
This section deals with these questions. In doing so, it is apt that 
we again tum to Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act, and in particular 
ASIC's so-called "dispensation power," contained in§ 655A of the Act. 
To begin with, some background on the dispensation power is useful. 
1. Overview of AS/C's Dispensation Power161 
The power of the corporate regulator ASIC to provide relief is said 
to originally derive from the Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Act 
1980 (Cth) ("Code"), as one of a number of important developments in 
the regulation of takeovers law in Australia. The regulator at the time, 
the National Companies and Securities Commission (NCSC) was 
161. Background derived from James McConvill & Mirko Bagaric, Opting Out of 
Shareholder Governance Rights: A New Perspective on Contractual Freedom in Australian 
Corporate Law, 3 DEPAUL Bus & COMM. L.J. 255 (2005). See also LEVY, supra note 102, 
at 233-35. 
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provided with this discretion to grant relief from the provisions of the 
Code as it was readily acknowledged that many provisions in the Code 
were quite complex and volatile, and strict application of the provisions 
could produce unintended and undesirable consequences. Furthermore, 
it was considered impossible to construct a black-letter takeovers law 
which would cover all the unforeseen circumstances which arise from 
takeover activity, and again ASIC's dispensation powers were 
considered important here in providing for flexibility in takeovers 
regulation. 
Before the adoption of the Code, there was some suggestion that 
Australia should adopt a "general principles" approach to national 
takeovers regulation like in the United Kingdom, rather than a "black 
letter law" approach like in the United States. It was ultimately settled 
that a "black letter law" approach was preferable, but only on the basis 
that the new regulator, the NCSC, would have discretionary power to 
grant relief from the operation of the takeover provisions. In one of the 
first evaluations of the 1980 Code and its provisions, Quentin Digby 
wrote that: 
The enactment of the Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Act 1980 
heralded an important development in the regulation of corporate 
takeovers in Australia. The National Companies and Securities 
Commission (the NCSC), which under the legislation became the 
body primarily responsible for administering the Takeover Code, was 
given an unprecedented level of discretionary power. The principal 
discretions accorded to the NCSC empowered the Commission to 
extend or reduce the coverage and effect of the Code in its application 
to particular instances of takeover conduct. 
... The 1980 Takeover Code represents a unique regulatory mix. As 
had been the case with earlier codes, the law was spelt out in a 
detailed "black letter" form. However, to introduce flexibility and to 
enable enforcement of the "spirit" of the Code, wide discretions were 
vested in the NCSC to modify the effect and coverage of the law. 162 
Quentin Digby went on to explain that the dispensation powers 
given to the NCSC in the Code ensured that there was a "commercially 
realistic approach" to the operation of the Code. 163 
In the High Court of Australia's decision of ASIC v DB 
Management Pty Ltd and Others; Southcorp Wines Pty Ltd v DB 
162. See Quentin Digby, The Principle Discretionary Powers of the National 
Companies and Securities Commission Under the Takeovers Code, 3 Co. & SEC. L.J. 216, 
217 (1984). 
163. Id. 
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Management Pty Ltd and Others,164 a useful discussion on the origins 
and rationale of ASIC's dispensation power was also provided. 165 The 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Financial Services Reform 
Amendment Bill 2003 (Cth) also included an explanation of the origins 
and rationale of ASIC's dispensation powers. 166 
Id. 
Since this relief power was first introduced ... it has over time been 
extended to apply to many other areas of Australia's corporations law. 
A similar power was considered necessary when a complicated regime 
facilitating share buy-backs was introduced later in the 1980' s 
(although does not operate under the present buy-back provisions in 
the Act which have been significantly rationalized), and has since also 
been utilized to provide for commercial flexibility in relation to the 
financial reporting provisions (except the removal of auditors under 
Section 329) in Part 2M, the fundraising provisions (Chapter 6D), 
164. (2007) 33 A.C.S.R. 447. 
165. Id. at 464. According to the Court: 
Section 57 and 58 of CASA [the Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Act 1980] 
contained provisions corresponding to Sections 728 and 730 of the Law. Section 57 
empowered the NCSC to exempt a person from compliance with all or any of the 
requirements of the Code. Section 58 empowered the NCSC to declare that the 
Code should have effect in its application to or in relation to a particular person or 
persons in a particular case as if a provision or provisions of the Code was or were 
omitted or varied or modified as specified, and 'where such a declaration is made, 
the Code has effect accordingly. 
This represented a legislative response to a problem of policy concerning regulation 
of takeovers. It involved a compromise between the technique of general legislative 
prescription applying inflexibility to all cases, and that of administrative discretion 
addressing issues on a case by case basis. The NCSC was given power, not merely 
to determine that, in certain cases, the legislative scheme would not apply, but also 
to modify or vary the operation of the scheme . . .. It created a new set of rights and 
obligations. 
166. Financial Services Reform Amendment Bill 2003, Supplementary Explanatory 
Memorandum,§ 3.58-3.59 (Austl.) 
ASIC uses its exemption and modification powers to provide administrative relief 
from the operation of various provisions of the legislation in circumstances where it 
judges that application of those provisions is not warranted, or that they should 
apply in a modified way. In most situations, the exemption and modification powers 
are exercised in response to requests for relief from parties who are experiencing 
difficulties complying with a particular provision of the legislation or where the 
application of the provisions is not appropriate in particular circumstances. 
Depending on the circumstances, the strict operation of the legislation may produce 
unintended or unreasonable results. Moreover, exemptions and modifications will 
often be necessary to facilitate innovative products that were not contemplated at the 
time the legislation was drafted, while maintaining an appropriate degree of investor 
protection. 
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provisions regulating managed investment schemes (Chapter 5C) and, 
most recently, was incorporated as a very important component of the 
financial services regime under Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act. 167 
The manner in which ASIC handles application for relief from the 
Corporations Act using its dispensation powers (includin~ § 655A 
which provides for relief from the provisions of Chapter 6)16 is set out 
in its Policy Statement 51. 169 
In my view, what is particularly significant about Policy Statement 
51 is that ASIC, whether knowing it or not, adopts a standard economic 
view of corporate regulation through employing a cost-benefit analysis 
Id. 
167. McConvill & Bargaric, supra note 161 . 
Although over time the reach of the ASIC's relief powers has extended to apply to 
most substantive provisions under the Corporations Act, what is very interesting is 
that the powers do not apply to provisions in the Act containing important 
participatory rights for shareholders, such as § 203D and the 100 member rule in § 
249D(l ). This has not been an accidental omission. When one looks at the 
Corporations Act in its entirety, it is quite clear that the exclusion of the ASIC's 
powers of relief from these provisions is quite deliberate. For example, the ASIC is 
given the power to exclude or modify the operation of particular provisions of Part 
2M of the Act regulating financial reporting, however specifically excluded from 
this power is the provision stating that the removal of a company's auditor(s) is to be 
approved by an ordinary meeting of shareholders. Moreover, the various rights of 
shareholders in relation to company meetings under Part 20.2 (e.g., the power of 
100 shareholders to requisition a shareholder meeting under § 249D( 1) can be 
modified, but only by the passage of Regulations under the Act, not by ASIC. 
168. Section 655A of the Corporations Act provides that: 
(1) ASIC may: 
(a) exempt a person from a provision of this Chapter; or 
(b) declare that this Chapter applies to a person as if specified provisions were 
omitted, modified or varied as specified in the declaration. 
Note: Under section 656A, the Panel has power to review the exercise by ASIC of 
its powers under this section. 
(2) In deciding whether to give the exemption or declaration, ASIC must consider 
the purposes of this Chapter set out in section 602. 
(3) The exemption or declaration may: 
(a) apply to all or specified provisions of this Chapter; and 
(b) apply to all persons, specified persons, or a specified class of 
persons; and 
( c) relate to all securities, specified securities or a specified class of 
securities; and 
( d) relate to any other matter generally or as specified. 
Corporations Act, 2001, § 655A (Austl.). Under section 656A, the Panel has the power to 
review the exercise by ASIC of its powers under this section. Corporations Act, 2001,§ 
656A (Austl.). 
169. See James McConvill, Removal of Directors Takes Centre Stage in Australia: An 
Exploration of the Corporate Law and Governance Issues, 1 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV. 
191, 235-36 (2005) (discussing the operation of ASIC's Policy Statement 51 in relation to 
applications for relief). 
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to determine whether it is appropriate or not for relief from the 
Corporations Act to be granted (in the form of modification or an 
exemption) in each particular instance. 
Applications for relief involve ASIC weighing up the regulatory 
burden and commercial benefit resulting from the proposed relief being 
granted. Policy Statement 51 provides that ASIC will grant relief 
where: 
(a) it considers that there is a net regulatory benefit; or 
(b) the regulatory detriment is minimal and is clearly outweighed by 
the resulting commercial benefit. 170 
According to Ford's Principles of Corporations Law, ASIC's 
dispensation power and policy statements comprise an "essential 
supplement" to the "black letter" of the Corporations Act, Corporations 
Regulations, and case law, particularly in the area of fundraising and 
takeovers. 171 Although commentary and material is available to explain 
how ASIC's power operates, I was quite surprised to find little in the 
way of detailed exploration of the rationale for having a relief power 
vested in ASIC, the desirability of the power from both a normative and 
practical perspective, why the relief power only applies to specific 
provisions of the Corporations Act rather than having a broad-ranging 
power which applies to all the provisions of the Act, and whether a 
more expansive relief power should be something to be considered. 
Due to the complexities and compliance costs associated with the 
financial reporting, fundraising and takeover provisions of the Act, I 
understand why ASIC has been given a power to grant modifications 
and exemptions for applicants in relation to these provisions, and it also 
explains why applications for takeovers and fundraising relief also 
forms a significant component of ASIC's work. It is quite clear that on 
many occasions the regulatory detriment of granting relief is minimal 
and is clearly outweighed by the commercial benefit of companies not 
being faced with the commercial burden of having to comply with the 
provision. 172 
170. ASIC, Policy Statement 51, PS 51.44 (Sept. 14, 2006), available at 
http://services.thomson.com.au/asic/ps/ps05 l.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2006). 
171. Id. at 51.3 (the "discretionary [power]" of the [Act] which are "most frequently 
[exercised]" affect the provisions in the Law concerning accounts, takeovers, and 
prospectuses); AUSTIN & RAMSAY, supra note 54, at 3.141 (showing that in 2000-01, ASIC 
considered 320 equity fundraising reliefapplications, and 638 takeover reliefapplications). 
172. Corporations Act, 2001, § 661A. One example is relief from§ 661(A) which 
essentially provides that ... if a party "and their associates have relevant interest in at least 
90% ... of the securities in a company," they can acquire the remaining shares for fair 
57
McConvill: Getting A Good Buy With A Little Help From A Friend: Turning To T
Published by SURFACE, 2006
210 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 34: 153 
2. Dispensation Power as a Mechanism for Contractual Freedom 
In Part II, it was explained that central to the economic analysis of 
law is the idea that the corporation is a "nexus of contracts" and that 
corporate law provisions should operate as a set of "default rules" that 
corporations can abide by or "opt out" of depending on whether the 
affairs of the corporation can be more efficiently organized outside of 
the formal regulatory regime. 173 
The role of the law, therefore, is to mimic the market (for corporate 
control or something else) as much as possible, so that the law becomes 
an attractive product when the transaction costs of operating outside of 
the formal regulatory regime become substantial. 
While economic thinking is central to the theory and practice of 
corporate law in the U.S., it has not assumed a significant role in 
relation to corporate law in Australia. 174 But the interesting thing is that 
while "law and economics" rarely forms part of the literature or 
discussion on corporate law in Australia, corporate law - including the 
law regulating takeovers - is structured so that, with some attention, it 
can align itself quite easily with the "contractarian" model of regulation 
promoted by adherents to an economic analysis of corporate law. 175 
A prime example of this is ASIC's dispensation power discussed 
above. This power provides an avenue for corporations to "opt out" of 
formal legal rules- including the provisions in Chapter 6 which regulate 
takeovers. While the dispensation power has not been considered to be 
a mechanism to "opt out" of corporate law, and accommodate 
"contractual freedom" in U.S. law and economic sense, it should be. 176 
Undoubtedly the main reason why dispensation powers of ASIC 
has not been seriously considered as a formal mechanism facilitating 
opting out of corporate law is the company and its shareholders do not 
have complete freedom to decide whether or not to opt out of a relevant 
provision. Rather, relief is dependent on ASIC providing consent. 177 
With this particular distinction in mind, "is it therefore appropriate 
to classify ASIC' s relief powers as a formal mechanism in the Act 
value. See e.g. Australian Securities and Investments Commission v. DB Management Pty 
Ltd, (2000) 199 C.L.R. 321(Austl.). Note also that under§ 661(A)(3), a court also has the 
power to change the 90% threshold. Corporations Act 2001 § 661(A)(3) (Austl.). 
173. McConvill & Bagaric, supra note 161, at 270-71. 
174. Id. at 256. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 269. 
177. Id. at 284-85. 
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facilitating opt out arrangements?"178 
A very important point to note here is that out of all the articles and 
books from a number of different countries that I have read, there is 
next to no reference to dispensation powers of corporate or securities 
regulators as being formal mechanisms facilitating opting out. The only 
discussion of the role of public regulators in the context of opting out of 
corporate law was in passing, with no real acknowledgment of the 
importance of this role. 179 
While many countries do not have a corporate regulator similar to 
the ASIC, or a corporate regulator vested with the dispensation powers 
that the ASIC enjoys, many countries do - so surely there has to be a 
reason why such an important aspect of corporate law has previously 
not been given serious consideration when discussing opt out 
arrangements. 
In my opinion, undoubtedly the main reason why dispensation 
powers of corporate regulators have not been seriously considered as 
formal mechanisms facilitating opting out of corporate law is the 
company and its shareholders do not have complete freedom to decide 
whether or not to opt out of a relevant provision(s). Thus, on this view, 
attaching a dispensation power to a particular provision does not alter 
the mandatory nature of the provision - companies are required to 
comply with the provision unless and until the regulator decides to 
provide relief. In other words, the ultimate discretion as to whether or 
not a company will comply or opt out of a provision is not with the 
company, but with the regulator. 
Accordingly, continuing this argument, there is a fundamental gulf 
between traditional private ordering or 'contracting out' of a corporate 
law rule by obtaining the approval of shareholders within the 
corporation, and the operation of a dispensation power by the public 
regulator outside of the corporation. The former involves literally 
opting out of a corporate law rule, the latter does not involve opting out 
of corporate law, but instead entails an alternative form of corporate law 
rule - abide by the procedure of obtaining approval by the regulator to 
be relieved from complying with a specific obligation or procedure in 
the Act. Put simply, opting out of corporate law must be a strictly 
private affair. Once there is the "public" involvement of the regulator, 
178. McConvill & Bagaric, supra note 161, at 284. 
179. See John C. Coffee Jr., No Exit? Opting Out, The Contractual Theory of the 
Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919 (1988); Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable 
Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1820, 1851 (1989). 
59
McConvill: Getting A Good Buy With A Little Help From A Friend: Turning To T
Published by SURFACE, 2006
212 Syracuse J. lnt'I L. & Com. [Vol. 34: 153 
the arrangement cannot be described as "opting out" but rather 
compliance with an alternative form of corporate law rule. 
In my opinion, however, this is a rather specious argument to run. 
One can never truly escape corporate regulation, even if the purpose of 
an arrangement or legislative initiative is to "avoid" corporate law rules. 
To be able to avoid or limit the application of a corporate law rule to a 
particular entity, person or circumstance itself requires some form of 
consenting action for this - either through the enactment or adoption of 
a legislative or executive rule authorizing this, or judicial endorsement 
of a particular arrangement (e.g., ratification by shareholders of 
a transaction in breach of a director's duty to avoid conflicts of interest). 
Accordingly, just like an individual's "freedom" in society does 
not provide a license to kill a person or steal from others, contractual 
"freedom" in corporate law does not exist in a pure form. Freedom is 
necessarily shaped by "boundaries." Contractual freedom in corporate 
law is embraced to provide for flexibility tempered by efficiency, and 
its reach therefore cannot extend to any opting out arrangements when 
many of these default arrangements would be inefficient. Professor 
John Coffee once wrote, in an important contribution on the judicial 
role in opting out of corporate law, that the courts in the U.S. have 
developed "standards" which companies endeavoring to opt out of 
particular corporate law rules need to work within to prevent their 
default arrangements being struck down by the court if challenged. 
This constructs a boundary around the freedom that companies have to 
opt out of particular corporate law rules that are enabling in nature. 180 
In his article, Coffee considers the cases where courts have been 
confronted with attempts to contract out of corporate law, and attempts 
to understand how courts might and should respond to innovative 
departures from the "traditional norms of corporate governance." The 
180. See John C. Coffee, Contractual . Freedom in Corporate Law-The 
Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1618, 1690 (1989): 
Id. 
If the new breed of lawyer-economists is to be listened to by courts, they must, in 
tum, listen to how courts think. How then do courts think about contractual freedom 
and opting out? Clearly, they do not view statutory corporate law as simply a body 
of default rules, which shareholders may waive at will. Rather, courts exercise 
substantial discretion to accept or reject a contractual innovation, depending upon 
whether they attribute a "fat" or a "thin" policy to the statutory norm asserted to be 
in conflict with the charter provision. As a statute begins to seem obsolete or 
superfluous, courts have recurrently shown a willingness to shrink their conception 
of its underlying policy, but only on a few occasions have courts converted a 
mandatory norm into a default rule. 
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article also focuses on the process of statutory interpretation and asks 
when, if ever, courts should make new mandatory rules or change old 
default rules. In reviewing the cases, Coffee explains that it can be seen 
that the courts develop standards for opting out so that shareholders are 
not able to opt out at will- and makes it clear that it cannot therefore be 
said that there is complete "contractual freedom." One example Coffee 
provides to support his contention is judicial decisions indicating that 
the courts prefer transaction-specific modifications or exemptions from 
fiduciary duties as opposed to ongoing relief. Furthermore, opting out 
of fiduciary duties has always been subject to the limitation that 
directors continue to meet a standard of good faith in their commercial 
behavior. 
In light of the above, I believe that there is no conceptual barrier to 
labeling dispensation powers of a corporate regulator, as a formal 
mechanism to 'opt out' of corporate law rules. There is no major 
difference between a private arrangement between the company and its 
shareholders or some other stakeholder which is subject to court 
challenge if constructed in a manner operating outside the realm of 
traditional norms of corporate governance (e.g. allowing commercial 
behavior by directors which does not comply with standards of good 
faith), and the power of a corporate regulator to grant an exception or 
modification to a particular company from the operation of a corporate 
law rule. 
Both mechanisms are subject to supervision, explicitly or 
implicitly, by a public body- placing limits on the discretion of the 
company; both mechanisms allow for the avoidance of a corporate law 
rule( s) in particular circumstances; both mechanisms are designed to 
ultimately accommodate a greater sense of flexibility and efficiency in 
corporate regulation (including the regulation of takeovers); and both 
mechanisms are themselves constructed by a corporate law rule and 
thus ultimately operate inside rather than outside the realm of corporate 
law. Accordingly, if there is a general consensus that traditional private 
arrangements, or "private ordering", can be said to constitute "opting 
out" of corporate law, then surely it can convincingly be said that the 
utilization of dispensation powers by a corporate regulator provides for 
"opting out" of corporate law. 181 
181. See McConvill, supra note 114 (including an extensive discussion of ASIC's 
discretionary powers and the appropriateness of relating them to literature on "opt in/opt 
out"). The article also includes a proposal to extend ASIC's modification and exemption 
powers to remove directors. See id. 
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B. Appreciating Real Genius: Section 611 (7) 
1. The Marketing of§ 611 (7) 
Section 655A provides for relief from Chapter 6 prov1s1ons, 
including § 611 (7). It has been pointed out above that a modification of 
§ 611 (7) in corporate control transactions is possible to enable 
interested shareholders to vote and/or to enable the potential acquiring 
company to put a resolution to target company shareholders. In this 
sense, § 611 (7) seems to fit within what Bebchuk and Hamdani have 
described as a "reversible default."182 
If § 611 (7) is used in this way, it provides a mechanism to bypass 
the formalities of Chapter 6 unless a formal Chapter 6 bid is considered 
to be in the best interests of all concerned. Modification of § 611 (7) to 
facilitate this, requiring a simple application to ASIC rather than 
legislative reform, simplifies takeovers regulation and makes regulation 
more efficient. 
This relationship between § 611(7) and § 655A needs to be better 
marketed. Section 611 (7) should be promoted as a device which can be 
utilized to inject greater flexibility into takeovers regulation. Section 
611 (7) can achieve the flexibility and efficiency that is considered to be 
lacking in Australian takeovers regulation. The task is to sell it this 
way. 
Section 611 (7) can make the market for corporate control in 
Australia more attractive. The distortion caused by a complex and 
burdensome takeovers code being imposed in a relatively small market 
can be corrected through putting forward § 611 (7) as a mechanism by 
which parties can be provided with greater freedom in how a particular 
control transaction is to be regulated. 
Importantly, there is a precedent for § 655A being utilized to 
modify § 611 (7) so that it has a wider scope. While, from my research, 
there has yet to be a clear example of § 611 (7) being used in the context 
of a hostile takeover, there are a number of examples of ASIC granting 
relief from § 611 (7) so that interested shareholders could vote. 
Therefore, it is far from radical to suggest that ASIC can play a 
part in injecting flexibility and efficiency into the regulation of 
takeovers in Australia. It is already doing so, albeit in a rather modest 
way. 
182. Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law 
Evolution, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 489, 493-95 (2002). A "reversible default" starts as a rule 
restrictive to management, and provides shareholders with the opportunity to "opt out." Id. 
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While more applications for medication of § 611 (7) could consume 
the resources of ASIC, ASIC does charge a fee for each relief 
application. 183 Accordingly, ASIC would generate funds from the extra 
applications that could be allocated to pay for an increase in 
professional and administrative staff as this was necessary to handle any 
extra workload. 
Importantly, viewing § 611 (7) through an economic, 
"contractarian" lens not only provides for flexibility in the operation of 
the Chapter 6 code, but also opens up the possibility of Chapter 6 
operating as a self-contained mechanism for regulating corporate 
control transactions in Australia. I have already said that schemes of 
arrangement should not apply to control transactions which come under 
the jurisdiction of Chapter 6. Section 611 (7) provides a way to end the 
dual system of schemes and Chapter 6 bids once and for all. 
At the end of the day, the transaction put to a shareholder vote 
under § 611 (7) is an "arrangement", an "arrangement" that covers a host 
of situations by which corporate control is transferred from one party to 
another. Why then do we need a separate regime in the form of Part 
5 .1, operating outside of Chapter 6, to deal with arrangements impacting 
on corporate control? 
The simple answer is, if § 611 (7) is capable of being modified by 
ASIC to have a broad operation, we do not. 
Furthermore, I believe that the application of § 611 (7) is far more 
desirable than the regime regulating schemes of arrangement. All of the 
commercial advantages explaining why schemes have been used for 
corporate control transactions (certainty, transparency, structural 
flexibility etc), can be obtained by using § 611 (7) to effect control 
transactions. At the same time, all the disadvantages recognized in 
using schemes (stemming mainly from the involvement at the court at 
each stage, which leads to cost and time issues, but also the fact that the 
scheme is an "all or nothing" chance for the acquiring company) can be 
avoided. 
Subject to the need to satisfy ASIC that shareholders are 
sufficiently informed of the proposed acquisition, and that their rights 
will not be abused, a resolution put to shareholders under § 611(7) can 
be structured in whatever way the parties want, to achieve whatever 
arrangement the parties desire. If it is 100% control the acquiring 
company wants, this can be specified in the arrangement put to 
183. See ASIC, Practice Note 58 (Jan. 13, 2006), How ASIC charges fees for relief 
applications, available at http://services.thomson.corn.au/asic/pn/pno58.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 30, 2006). 
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shareholders for a vote. If a particular commercial or tax advantage is 
sought through an acquisition, the arrangement can be structured to 
achieve this outcome. If it is felt that certain shareholders should vote 
separately on the transaction during to having a distinct interest in the 
transaction which differs to other shareholders, the arrangement can be 
designed so that shareholders vote in separate classes. 
Whereas a court overseeing a scheme under Part 5 .1 tries to ensure 
that shareholders are treated in a fair and reasonable manner, with a § 
611 (7) arrangement, the Takeovers Panel will continue to have 
jurisdiction to make a declaration of "unacceptable circumstances", 
under § 657D, if shareholders are ill-treated. As was discussed in 
Section three, a declaration of unacceptable circumstances can be made 
if the particular transaction fails to satisfy one or more of the principles 
in § 602. Whereas a court can refuse to approve a scheme, the 
Takeovers Panel can make orders having the effect that the takeover 
either doesn't proceed, or doesn't proceed in the manner intended. 
2. Section 611 (7) as a "Choice-Enhancing Mechanism" 
Investor confidence is a crucial feature of efficient financial 
markets. It facilitates attracting the capital necessary for ensuring the 
liquidity required for an efficient capital market. A higher market 
turnover provides a more effective price mechanism as a result of the 
increased information available from increased transaction volume. 
Investor protection is a significant element contributing to market 
confidence. People will be less likely to invest directly in the capital 
market if they perceive that they are likely to receive lower returns 
because of insufficient information or a weak bargaining position. 184 
As a "choice-enhancing mechanism,"185 which also has built in the 
184. Australian Department of Treasury, Policy Framework, available at 
http: //www.treasury.gov.au/documents/267/HTML/docshell.asp?URL=index.asp (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2006). 
185. See Lucian Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and 
Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REv. 111. According to Bebchuk and Ferrell, more 
choice rather than less choice in relation to takeovers regulation is to be favored. They 
further argue for "choice enhancement" through two initiatives: (1) the development of a 
federal law regulating takeovers in the U.S.; and (2) the introduction of a "procedural rule" 
permitting unilateral action on the part of a majority of shareholders to reincorporate into the 
federal takeovers law regime. See id. See also Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, 
Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk? Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 
112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002) (explaining "choice enhancing"); Stephen Choi and Andrew 
Guzman, Choices and Federal Intervention in Corporate Law, 87 VA. L. REV. 961, 981 
(2001) ("The procedural rule advocated by Bebchuk and Ferrell consists of a mandatory 
voting procedure through which a majority of shareholders . . . can choose federal takeover 
rules rather than those of the State in which the corporation is incorporated. Shareholders 
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regulatory protections of the antiquated scheme regime but without the 
costly inefficiencies, § 611 (7) is more in line with how shareholders 
would hypothetically bargain for their takeovers regulation, and 
therefore is a more desirable form of regulation. 
Based on economic theory, investors are more inclined to bargain 
for a form of regulation which is less costly and more efficient. 
According to Brian Cheffins in his excellent work Company Law: 
Theory, Structure and Operation, regulation should be shaped through 
hypothetical bargaining, which involves "thinking about what rational 
transactors would contract for if they had perfect information, did not 
face significant transaction costs, and could be fully confident that the 
agreements reached would be performed as arranged."186 
According to a Nobel Prize winning theory developed by the 
University of Chicago's Ronald Coase, in the absence of transaction 
costs, which distort the effective operation of a particular market, 
regulation shifts towards its most efficient use. 187 In The Encyclopaedia 
of Law and Economics, Medema and Zerbe Jr., provide the following 
useful explanation of the so-called "Coase Theorem." 
Coase argued that, "from an economic perspective, the goal of the 
legal system should be to establish a pattern of rights such that 
economic efficiency is attained."188 
can vote in a similar way to exit the federal scheme and return to state. These votes would 
be binding on the corporation."). 
In the context of takeovers and shareholder empowerment, Lucian Bebchuk has also put 
forward the idea of "undistorted shareholder choice," by making it necessary for hostile 
bidders to win a vote of shareholder support. See Lucian Bebchuk, The Case Against Board 
Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 973, 982 (2002) ("A voting mechanism 
provides a 'clean' way of enabling shareholders to express separately their preferences [in 
relation to whether a takeover should go ahead, and whether they want their shares acquired 
under the takeover]."). See also Lucian Bebchuk, Towards Undistorted Choice and Equal 
Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1697-98 (1985) ("According to 
the undistorted choice objective, a target should be acquired if and only if its shareholders, 
or at least shareholders holding a majority of its shares, judge the offer acquisition price to 
be higher than the independent target's value."). 
186. BRIAN CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION 264 
(Oxford University Press 1997). 
187. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); 
available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/socrates/coase.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2006) (discussing 
the Coase Theorem: "in a world where there are no transaction costs, an efficient outcome 
will occur regardless of the initial allocation of property rights."). 
188. STEVEN G. MEDEMA & RICHARD 0. ZERBE JNR., The Coase Theorem, in THE 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 836 (Gerrit de Geest & Boudewijn Boukaert, eds. 
2000). 
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There are two general claims about outcomes which represent the 
Coase Theorem. 
The first is that, regardless of how rights are initially assigned, the 
resulting allocation of resources will be efficient. This proposition -
the "efficiency hypothesis" - is reflected in all statements of the 
Theorem. The second claim, which is not reflected in all statements of 
the Theorem, is that the final allocation of resources will be invariant 
under alternative assignment of rights. 189 
Coase believed that government's role is to eliminate or at least 
reduce transaction costs, where these are present, through the use of 
regulation. Transaction cost economics is all about what kinds of 
initiatives (such as firms or markets) will minimize the transaction costs 
of producing and distributing a particular good or service. 190 
When transaction costs - that is, the costs involved in an economic 
exchange - are present, as they are in the market for corporate control, 
the most effective approach to regulation is to try and reduce the 
transaction costs so that the market is more efficient. But at the same 
time, an unfettered market is not desirable if lack of investor confidence 
due to poor protection hampers efficiency. 
The elevation of § 611 (7), in the manner outlined above, is 
designed to provide an option to choose an approach to the regulation of 
a takeover which reduces transaction costs involved in the alternative 
options of schemes of arrangement or a full-scale Chapter 6 takeover 
bid, but still imbedding the protections of these regimes. As a product 
in the market for corporate control, fresh thinking about § 611 (7) makes 
takeovers regulation more attractive, and sets in place a product strategy 
which should have the effect of increasing consumer demand for the 
189. Id. at 838. Medema and Zerbe Jnr. provide an explanation of the Coase Theorem 
from a non-cooperative game perspective: 
The initial assignment of rights establishes the utility level of each player in the 
absence of further reallocations of resources and there are assumed to exist 
reallocations of resources which are efficiency enhancing, in the sense that the 
utility of one player can be increased without reducing the utility of the other player. 
However, neither party will agree to an alteration in the allocation of resources 
unless that reallocation increases its utility. 
Id. at 852. 
190. See Wikipedia, Coase Theorem, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coase_theorem (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2006) 
Id. 
[T]he theorem states that in the absence of transaction costs, all government 
allocations of property are equally efficient, because interested parties will bargain 
privately to correct any extemality. As a corollary, this theorem also implies that in 
the presence of transaction costs, government may minimize inefficiency by 
allocating property initially to the party assigning it the greatest utility. 
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product. 
It is for this reason that the ideas outlined in this article should be 
given serious attention going forward. 
CONCLUSION 
The market for corporate control has been recognized as one of the 
primary mechanisms operating to ensure that directors and managers 
remain accountable to shareholders, and that the interests of 
management and shareholders are aligned. 
Takeovers law is a product offered in this market, a product which 
can be effective in promoting efficiency by way of building investor 
confidence, but which can be a burden if the law distorts the operation 
of the market. 
The manner in which takeovers law should be structured, and the 
considerations which should guide its development, has been a major 
issue since the 1980s. 
Takeovers law has been a primary area of focus among 
commentators interested in the economic analysis of law in general, and 
corporate law in particular. As has been discussed in this article, 
economic analysis of takeovers law raises questions about whether 
mandatory rules have a place at all in the market for corporate control. 
While economic analysis of law, including takeovers law, has been 
prominent in the United States and some European countries, it has yet 
to be really embraced in Australia. 
In this article, I have argued that it is time for this to change. 
Economic analysis has much to offer. In this article, I have perceived 
takeovers law as a product in a market, just like a pair of glasses or a 
candy bar. I suggested that in Australia this product, in its present form, 
is not being marketed effectively to highlight the genius of the product. 
It was explained that Australian takeovers law can facilitate the 
flexibility and efficiency that economic analysis suggests is central to an 
effective program of takeovers regulation. This does not require law 
reform. Rather, it was argued that takeovers law, as a product in the 
market for corporate control, can be reinvigorated through the 
application of basic principles of marketing. 
A "product management" approach to takeovers law can change in 
a fundamental way how takeovers are regulated in Australia, without a 
drop of legislative ink. 
The end result of this product management approach is that the 
dual system of schemes of arrangement and formal Chapter 6 bids, 
which the market for corporate control in Australia presently endures, 
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would end. 
Contrary to what some commentators have recently proposed, I 
believe that schemes of arrangement can, and should, be removed from 
the takeovers regime in Australia through effective marketing of one 
little-known provision in Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act: § 611 (7). 
This article explained this can be achieved. The challenge now is to put 
the vision in this article into practice. 
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